Essays on how health and education affect the labor market outcomes of workers by Namingit, Sheryll
Essays on how health and education affect the labor market outcomes of
workers
by
Sheryll Namingit
M.A., University of the Philippines, 2006
M.A., Kansas State University, 2013
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Economics
College of Arts and Sciences
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
2017
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on how health and education affect the la-
bor market outcomes of workers. Health and education issues have been key determinants
of labor demand and supply. In light of increasing incidence of health problems and the
rapid growth of post-baccalaureate certificates in the US, this dissertation seeks to answer
questions about labor market outcomes of workers with poor health history and with post-
baccalaureate certificates.
The first essay which I co-authored with Dr. William Blankenau and Dr. Benjamin
Schwab uses a re´sume´-based correspondence test to compare the employment consequences
of an illness-related employment gap to those of an unexplained employment gap. The
results of the experiment show that while the callback rate of applicants with an illness-
related employment gap is lower than that of the newly unemployed, applicants with illness-
related employment gaps are 2.3 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than
identical applicants who provide no explanation for the gap. Our research provides evidence
that employers use information on employment gaps as additional signals about workers’
unobserved productivity.
Co-authored with Dr. Amanda Gaulke and Dr. Hugh Cassidy, the second essay tests how
employers perceive the value of post-baccalaureate certificates using the same methodology
in the first essay. We randomly assign a post-baccalaureate certificate credential to fictitious
re´sume´s and apply to real vacancy postings for managerial, administrative and accounting
assistant positions on a large online job board. We find that post-baccalaureate certificates
are 2.4 percentage points less likely to receive a callback than those without this credential.
However, this result is driven by San Francisco, and there is no effect in Los Angeles or
New York. By occupation, we also find that there is only significant negative effect in
administrative assistant jobs, and there is none in managerial or accounting assistant jobs.
A typographical error made in the re´sume´s of certificate holders regarding the expected year
of completion of the certificate may also contribute to negative effects of a certificate.
Using NLSY79 data, the third essay tests whether the source of health insurance creates
incentives for newly-diagnosed workers to remain sufficiently employed to maintain access
to health insurance coverage. I compare labor supply responses to new diagnoses of workers
dependent on their own employment for health insurance with the responses of workers who
are dependent on their spouse’s employer for health insurance coverage. I find that workers
who depend on their own job for health insurance are 1.5-5.5 percentage points more likely to
remain employed and for those employed, are 1.3-5.4 percentage points less likely to reduce
their labor hours and are 2.1-6.1 percentage points more likely to remain full-time workers.
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incentives for newly-diagnosed workers to remain sufficiently employed to maintain access
to health insurance coverage. I compare labor supply responses to new diagnoses of workers
dependent on their own employment for health insurance with the responses of workers who
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Chapter 1
Sick and Tell: A Field Experiment
Analyzing the Effects of an
Illness-Related Employment Gap on
the Callback Rate
1.1 Introduction
Poor health may lead to a temporary gap in employment. Such joblessness can occur if
health problems result in reduced ability to function in the workplace or if treatment inter-
feres with work activities. For example, a worker may be diagnosed with cancer and exit
the workforce for treatment. Even upon recovery and receiving a positive prognosis, labor
market consequences of the illness may persist. Both the gap in the employment record
and the health issue itself may be relevant to employers in deciding how to respond to a
worker’s application as she re-enters the labor market. In this paper, we present the results
of a re´sume´-based correspondence test designed to explore the effects of an illness-related
employment gap on the probability that an applicant will receive a callback upon applying
for a job.
1
Recent research confirms that employers are less likely to make callbacks to applicants
with an employment gap on their re´sume´s. However, little work has been done to explore how
this propensity changes when the gap results from an illness. On one hand, applicants with
illness-related employment gaps may be particularly risky. Employers may be concerned that
individuals with illness-related gaps will have lower current and future productivity given
weaker physical strength, greater routine medical needs, and a higher likelihood of being sick
in the future. There may be concerns as well that human capital depreciates more quickly
in employment gaps for those dealing with health issues, as treatment takes precedence over
job market considerations.1 Moreover, employees with a history of poor health may impose
higher health care costs on employers who offer health insurance.
A strand of the literature provides evidence that employers are indeed sensitive to the
health status of workers. In jobs where employers offer employer-sponsored health insurance,
high health risk workers such as women, those who are obese and those who smoke, tend
to receive lower wages to compensate for the higher health insurance premiums paid by
employers.2
On the other hand, an unexplained gap may provide a different sort of negative signal to
employers. Employer screening models suggest that employment gaps are negatively corre-
lated with unobserved productivity.3 As a result, employers may feel that the unemployed
are less productive on average. This may be reinforced by the suspicion that companies
who have interviewed the applicant for other positions have found unfavorable indicators
that prevented job offers.4 Anecdotal evidence of such concerns is not difficult to find.
Some employers even explicitly state in job ads that they do not consider unemployed job
applicants.5
If the gap is explained as resulting from an illness, the applicant may be exempt from
1Human capital models suggest that skills of potential workers depreciate through periods of joblessness.
See Acemoglu (1995); Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
2See Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009); Cowan and Schwab (2011a, 2016).
3See Vishwanath (1989); Lockwood (1991).
4See Oberholzer-Gee (2008).
5Legal experts say that the practice probably does not violate discrimination laws because unemployment
is not a protected status, like age or race. However, New Jersey recently passed an anti-discrimination law
against the unemployed and other states are considering similar legislation (Rampell (2011)).
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these conditional assessments. Illness strikes productive and unproductive workers alike.
Moreover, a worker currently re-entering the labor market after an illness has not been
subject to the scrutiny of other employers to the same extent as those who have been looking
for work since the separation from previous employment. The expected productivity of a
worker with an illness-related employment gap may be closer to that of the general worker
population than to that of the long-term unemployed. For job applicants who experience a
health shock, providing information on the reason for the employment gap may mitigate, if
not eradicate, the unemployment bias.
We begin our study by developing a theoretical framework that helps to disentangle
these competing effects. The model shows under what conditions researchers should expect
that revealing the cause of a gap will increase or decrease the callback rate. The key to
the results is that productivity is negatively correlated with experiencing an employment
gap, but uncorrelated with becoming ill. Employment costs related to health issues, in
contrast, are correlated with prior illness and uncorrelated with productivity. As a result, an
unexplained gap gives negative information about expected productivity and an explained
illness-related gap gives negative information about expected health costs. The clarity of
these signals and the distributions of productivity and health costs determine the relative
callback rates.
We then turn to an experiment that explores callback rates contingent on employment
gaps that are either explained or unexplained. In our field experiment, carefully prepared
re´sume´s and corresponding cover letters were sent to employers who advertised vacancies
in online job boards. For each vacancy, we sent three types of re´sume´s. One re´sume´ con-
tained an explained illness-related employment gap while another contained an unexplained
employment gap. These were in contrast to a third re´sume´ where the applicant was newly
unemployed (no gap). For illness-related and unexplained employment gaps, the re´sume´s
showed no employment over the previous seven months or more.
To signal an illness-related employment gap, a phrase in the cover letter explained that the
employment gap was due to a physical illness followed by a full recovery. An additional signal
on medical history was sent via information in the re´sume´ that indicates involvement in a
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cancer recovery support group. The corresponding cover letters of re´sume´s with unexplained
gaps did not provide any explanation for the gap. For the re´sume´ of newly unemployed
applicants, the length of the gap is limited to less than two months. Based on the literature,
this is too short a gap to bring about adverse effects. The corresponding cover letter of
newly unemployed applicants notes that the applicant left the last job because her family
had to move from another state and that she is currently looking for a new job. We chose
this control as our ‘no gap’ group because applicants who are currently working tend to have
fewer callbacks (Kroft et al. (2013)). From March to September, 2016, we sent 3,771 re´sume´s
to 1,257 sales, administrative, and accounting assistant jobs.
Outcomes are measured in terms of differences in the callback rate of each type of re´sume´.
The results of the experiment show that newly unemployed applicants had the highest call-
back rate (27.4%). Consistent with previous studies, re´sume´s with an employment gap
received lower callback rates, indicating that such gaps negatively affect hiring outcomes.
However, re´sume´s with an explained illness-related gap received a higher callback rate than
re´sume´s with an unexplained gap (25.6 % versus 23.3%). Within the context of our theo-
retical model, these results suggest that the negative productivity signal of an unexplained
gap outweighs undesirable factors associated with poor health history.
Our work contributes to the literature that examines how hiring probabilities depend on
the duration of unemployment (i.e. duration dependence). Results from studies using non-
experimental methods are mixed. In a review of the literature, Machin and Manning (1999),
find little evidence supporting duration dependence. In contrast, a separate set of studies
concludes that duration dependence plays a significant role in labor market outcomes.6 As
pointed out by Oberholzer-Gee (2008), non-experimental studies of duration dependence
suffer endogeneity problems. The effects of employment gaps can be difficult to separate from
the effects of other important worker characteristics that determine employment prospects.
Results from studies that use correspondence tests, where identification is derived from
experimentally induced variation, provide more consistent results. Several such studies find
that employment gaps beyond a threshold duration negatively affect the likelihood of being
6See Lynch (1989); Van den Berg and Ours (1996); Imbens and Lynch (2006); Shimer (2008).
4
invited for an interview.7 Some refinements of these findings have been considered. Eriks-
son and Rooth (2014) find that while contemporary employment gaps negatively affect the
likelihood of getting a callback, past employment gaps do not. Kroft et al. (2013) show that
duration dependence is stronger when the labor market is tighter. Ghayad (2013) shows that
positive traits such as work experience can compensate for employment gaps.
To our knowledge, Baert et al. (2016) is the only research that investigates whether the
effects of long illness-related gaps are distinct from equally long unexplained employment
gaps. However, the paper only focuses on the effects of mental illness (i.e. depression) and
do not include physical illness. Results from this smaller-scale correspondence study show no
significant effect of an employment gap caused by mental illness relative to an unexplained
employment gap in Belgium.
Studies that investigate illness-related employment gaps are important, in part, because
health issues affect a large part of the potential labor force in the US. For example, in 2014,
the number of working age adults who were not in the labor force because of illness or
disability reached 13 million, or 6.4 percent of the US population.8
Our results provide an additional refinement by showing that explaining the gap as
resulting from a non-mental medical issue can dampen duration dependence in the US. While
not explicitly stated, the applications received by employers implied that each health-related
gap was due to cancer. We chose cancer since its characteristics are consistent with our
experimental design. Cancer treatment plausibly causes an employment gap for treatment.
Patients who receive a good post-treatment prognosis can return to the labor market with
undiminished productivity. Cancer is perceived to be onset-uncontrollable, which prevents
employers from forming inferences about productivity from the diagnosis. Moreover, there
is a chance that former patients may impose costs to employers through a future relapse or
related healthcare issues. Thus, cancer per se, is not the focus of the paper but rather a
reasonable proxy for health-related gaps more generally.
Nonetheless, by explaining the gap as related to cancer, we provide evidence on another
7Specifically, 9 months for Eriksson and Rooth (2014), 18 months for Oberholzer-Gee (2008), 6 months
for Kroft et al. (2013) and 6 months for Ghayad (2013).
8Based on the 2015 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey.
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poorly understood issue: the true impact of cancer survivorship on employment. Several
studies confirm that cancer patients often are temporarily unable to work. Many also find
high-rates of long-term unemployment (Bradley et al. (2007b)). While much of that literature
has focused on supply-side issues (e.g. lingering effects of chemotherapy), our paper is the
first to demonstrate the role of employers in the struggle of some cancer survivors to find
work.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we give more detail on the
theoretical model. In Section 1.3, we describe the experimental design. Section 1.3 explains
the empirical strategy while Section 1.4 reports the results and interpretation. Section 1.6
concludes and provides suggestions for future studies.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Before presenting the experimental design, we provide a theoretical framework that helps
clarify the role of employment gaps in providing signals of productivity and health costs. We
establish a simple framework to provide an example of how these signals can result in callback
probabilities ordered: no gap, explained gap, unexplained gap. The key to this result is that
productivity is correlated with the likelihood of getting a job offer but uncorrelated with the
likelihood of becoming ill, while health costs9 are correlated with illness and uncorrelated with
job offers. As a result, an unexplained gap gives negative information about productivity
and an explained gap gives negative information about health costs. The clarity of these
signals and the distributions of productivity and health costs determine the relative callback
rates.
Let θ be the expected benefit of a callback from the point of view of the employer. This
expected benefit will depend on items such as the probability that the employer will want
to hire the applicant after the callback, that the applicant will take the job, that she will do
well in the job, stay in the job, etc. We refer to such items collectively as productivity. For
9For simplicity, we refer to all potential negative consequences of hiring unhealthy workers as “health
costs.”
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simplicity we let θ be uniformly distributed such that
fΘ (θ) =
 1 for θ ∈ [0, 1]0 otherwise. (1.1)
The productivity measure θ is not observed by the employer. The employer does observe
a signal S ∈ {n, i, u} which may be informative about θ. A signal n means the applicant has
no employment gap, i means an illness related gap, and u means an unexplained gap. By
Bayes’ law, the distribution of θ conditional on S = s is
fΘ (θ|S = s) = P (S = s|Θ = θ) fΘ (θ)
P (S = s)
. (1.2)
The signal depends on two shocks to the applicant in the previous period. A positive
health shock means that the applicant was physically available to work. The probability of
a positive health shock is independent of productivity and set to ω. A positive employment
shock means that the worker, if healthy, had a job. Because good workers tend to remain
employed, this is correlated with productivity. For simplicity the probability of a positive
shock is set to θ. Given this, s = n if in the previous period the applicant received a positive
health shock and a positive employment shock, s = u if the applicant had a positive health
shock but a negative employment shock, and s = i if the applicant received a negative health
shock. That is:
P (S = n|Θ = θ) = ωθ (1.3)
P (S = u|Θ = θ) = ω (1− θ) (1.4)
P (S = i|Θ = θ) = (1− ω) . (1.5)
Given these conditional probabilities and equation (1.1) we can find the unconditional
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probability of each type of shock:
P (S = n) =
ω
2
(1.6)
P (S = i) = (1− ω) (1.7)
P (S = u) =
ω
2
. (1.8)
Equations (1.1) and (1.3)-(1.8) into (1.2) give the following conditional distributions
fΘ (θ|S = n) = 2θ
fΘ (θ|S = i) = 1
fΘ (θ|S = u) = 2 (1− θ)
with support θ ∈ [0, 1]. From this and equation (1.1), the conditional expected productivities
are
E (θ|S = n) = 2
3
E (θ|S = i) = 1
2
E (θ|S = u) = 1
3
.
Note that E (θ|S = u) < E (θ) = 1
2
= E (θ|S = i). That is the expected θ conditional on
S = u is less than the unconditional expectation for θ while the expected θ conditional on
S = i is equal to the unconditional expectation. This reflects that employers learn something
about productivity from applicants without illness related gaps but an illness related gap
gives no information regarding productivity.
A firm may receive many applications for a position, However from the perspective of the
researcher, each firm receives a triplet of applications. With a one-to-one correspondence
between firms and triplets we use k to index both. Upon receiving this triplet, the problem
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for the firm is to maximize the expected net return to making callbacks, given by Vk. To
maximize this, the firm chooses a callback strategy Ck = {cn,k, ci,k, cu,k}, where cn,k, ci,k, cu,k
∈ {0, 1} and cs,k = 1 means make a callback to the applicant from triplet k with signal
S = s. Finally, cs,k = 0 means do not call that applicant back.
The value of Vk is equal to the sum of expected productivity and an idiosyncratic shock
less an expected health care expenditure on the applicant if hired and a reservation level
of returns. The shock εs,k is known to the employer before making callbacks. It represents
idiosyncratic items unobservable to the researcher that increase or decrease the value of a
callback from the employer’s perspective. Let E (H|S = s) be the expected health related
cost from hiring an agent given signal s. This could be insurance costs, costs due to lost
work days in the future, lost productivity, a higher probability of future separation, etc. Let
Rk be a reservation level of expected returns which must be exceeded in order to warrant a
callback. This can reflect the cost of a callback, recruitment, training, etc. We can write the
firm’s problem in dealing with this triplet as
maxVk = max
Ck
∑
s∈{n,i,u}
[E (θ|S = s) + εs,k − E (H|S = s)−Rk] (1.9)
Stated differently, the firm decides independently whether to respond to each applicant in
the triplet.
We normalize health costs such thatE (H|S = n) = E (H|S = u) = 0 and setE (H|S = i) =
hE (θ|S = i) = h
2
. Given this, E (θ|S = i) − E (H|S) = 1−h
2
. We economize on notation by
setting Ts,k ≡ εs,k −Rk. Then equation (1.9) simplifies to
Vk = max
Ck
[
2
3
− Tn,k
]
+
[
1− h
2
− Ti,k
]
+
[
1
3
− Tu,k
]
.
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The optimal strategy for the firm is
Ck =

{1, 1, 1} if Tn,k ≤ 23 , Ti,k ≤ 1−h2 , Tu,k ≤ 13
{1, 1, 0} if Tn,k ≤ 23 , Ti,k ≤ 1−h2 , Tu,k > 13
{1, 0, 1} if Tn,k ≤ 23 , Ti,k > 1−h2 , Tu,k ≤ 13
{1, 0, 0} if Tn,k ≤ 23 , Ti,k > 1−h2 , Tu,k > 13
{0, 1, 1} if Tn,k > 23 , Ti,k≤ 1−h2 , Tu,k ≤ 13
{0, 1, 0} if Tn,k > 23 , Ti,k ≤ 1−h2 , Tu,k > 13
{0, 0, 1} if Tn,k > 23 , Ti,j > 1−h2 , Tu,k ≤ 13
{0, 0, 0} if Tn,k > 23 , Ti,k > 1−h2 , Tu,k > 13 .
To simplify even more, we let Tn,k, Ti,k, Tu,k be i.i.d. u[0, 1]. This allows us to easily
find the probability that a firm chooses any strategy Ck; i.e. P (Ck = {cn,k, ci,k, cu,k}). This
will in turn be equal to the share of firms having this strategy in the population of firms
P (C = {cn, ci, cu}). In particular we find
P {1, 1, 1} = 1−h
9
P {1, 1, 0} = 2(1−h)
9
P {1, 0, 1} = 1+h
9
P {1, 0, 0} = 2(1+h)
9
P {0, 1, 1} = 1−h
18
P {0, 1, 0} = 1−h
9
P {0, 0, 1} = 1+h
18
P {0, 0, 0} = 1+h
9
.
We now turn attention to the percentage of instances in which each signal is favored. An
application in a triplet with signal S = s is favored if the application receives a callback while
at least one other application in the triplet does not. Let P (F |S = s) be the probability that
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an application with signal s is favored. For example, P (F |S = n) = P {1, 1, 0}+P {1, 0, 1}+
P {1, 0, 0} . Given this
P (F |S = s) =

5+h
9
if s = n
7(1−h)
18
if s = i
2+h
9
if s = u
so
P (F |S = n) > max {P (F |S = i) , P (F |S = u)}
and
P (F |S = i) > P (F |S = u) iff h < 1
3
.
This shows that so long as h is not too large, applicants with no gap are most likely to be
preferred, followed by an illness gap and an unexplained gap. However, all will be preferred
in some share of the cases.
To find the probability of a callback, we add P {1, 1, 1} to P (F |S = s). This gives
P (C|S = s) =

2
3
if s = n
1−h
2
if s = i
1
3
if s = u
so that
P (C|S = n) > max {P (C|S = i) , P (C|S = u)}
and
P (C|S = i) > P (F |S = u) iff h < 1
3
.
This shows that so long as h is not too large, applicants with no gap are most likely to
get a callback followed by an illness gap and an unexplained gap.
11
1.3 Experimental Design
The correspondence test methodology has been used to provide insights on hiring discrimina-
tion based on race, ethnicity, immigration, gender, sexual orientation and age.10 The method
involves sending similar job applications to employers posting jobs with the only difference
being a characteristic that signals membership to a group. We employ this methodology to
study how employers respond to a job applicant’s illness-related employment gap compared
to unexplained gap or no gap.
The experiment was carried out between March, 2016, and September, 2016. Over this
period, we surveyed eligible employment ads from multiple online job boards. For each job
ad, we customized fictitious re´sume´s and sent them to employers. We then measured em-
ployers’ responses to our fictitious job seekers’ application.11
We chose the following occupations: sales and customer service, clerical/administrative
assistant and accounting assistant jobs.12 We targeted these jobs for several reasons. First,
these types of jobs do not require complex skills and are fairly similar across firms which
allows us to easily create suitable generic re´sume´s. Second, there are enough numbers of
available jobs in online job boards in these fields to conduct a sufficiently powered study.
We limited our sample to job ads that required 6 or fewer years of work experience. We
restricted our experiment to 15 of the most populous cities of the United States.13 We chose
jobs that allowed direct uploads of re´sume´s and cover letters to apply. We eliminated any
ad where applicants were asked to call or appear in person or that required re´sume´s to be
submitted to external websites.
We recorded available information about the job, including the date the job ad was
10See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Arai et al. (2015), Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2014),
Baert et al. (2015), Carlsson and Rooth (2007), (Drydakis and Vlassis, 2010) and Neumark et al. (2015). It
has been extended to identify hiring penalties associated with motherhood, physical unfitness, obesity and
criminal record. For examples, see Correll et al. (2007), Rooth (2011), Rooth (2009) and Pager (2003).
11The experimental protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Kansas
State University.
12As in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Kroft et al. (2013).
13New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Philadelphia, PA; Phoenix, AZ; San
Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; Dallas, TX; San Jose, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Indianapolis, IN; San Francisco,
CA; Austin, TX; Columbus, OH.
12
posted, position, company name, company address, telephone number and job requirements
(education level and skills required). We also recorded whether the ad explicitly stated that
the employer required physical capacity to lift objects and whether it required a stable job
history. Moreover, we also collected information on whether the ad stated that the em-
ployer provided employer-sponsored health insurance and other benefits. This information
was used to create the re´sume´s and where relevant, was used in the statistical analysis. We
collected jobs and sent re´sume´s by batch. More specifically, the size of a batch depends on
the available jobs at the particular time of data collection and ranges from about 30 to 150
jobs. We prepared and sent the re´sume´s for one batch of job ads before collecting a new
batch of job ads.
Three equally qualified artificial re´sume´s and corresponding cover letters were customized
for each job ad. These three re´sume´s sent to a single job ad constitute one triplet.14 Using
the re´sume´ randomizer developed by Lahey and Beasley (2009), we then randomly assigned
treatments and other re´sume´ details to each type of re´sume´.15
All of the re´sume´s that we sent indicated a contemporary employment gap. The re´sume´s
differed in terms of the duration of the employment gaps and assignment of the explanation
for the gap.16 Thus if applicable, the type of employment gap was explicitly explained in the
cover letter and an additional signal was sent using the interest section of the re´sume´. By
differing the employment gaps and gap explanation (or the lack of it) in each of the re´sume´s
in a triplet, we can identify the effects of the types of employment gaps on the employment
prospects of job seekers. Each re´sume´ in the triplet belonged to one of the following three
treatment groups.
A re´sume´ in treatment group 1 signaled an applicant who was newly unemployed. We
used newly unemployed, rather than currently employed, as Kroft et al. (2013) and Eriksson
and Rooth (2014) find that a currently employed worker is less likely to be called back for an
14Accordingly, we have 1,257 triplets since we applied to 1,257 jobs.
15We exported these characteristics assignment to a spreadsheet, which was used as input to re´sume´
creation in Microsoft Word using the Mail Merge function.
16Non-employment duration appeared on the re´sume´ in the form of an end date for the applicant’s most
recent job. For example, if the re´sume´ is assigned a 8-month employment then the end date of the applicant’s
last job is 8 months from the date the re´sume´ was sent.
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interview than a newly unemployed individual. Kroft et al. (2013) suggest that employers
may perceive individuals who engaged in on-the-job search as less loyal and prone to job
hopping. In addition, some jobs require workers to start immediately which may be typical
of the sample of jobs in our experiment. To minimize these effects, the corresponding cover
letter indicated that the applicant resigned from her last employment due to a family deci-
sion to relocate from Seattle.17 Applicants with this type of gap are said to have no relevant
employment gap.
A re´sume´ in treatment group 2 contained a signal that the applicant had an illness-related
gap for a notable period of time. For most of the sample this was 7 to 12 months. For 5% of
the sample this was 20 to 22 months. In this treatment, a phrase in the cover letter explained
that the gap is due to a medical illness followed by a complete recovery. An additional signal
on the medical history was sent via information in the re´sume´ which indicated involvement
in a support group for cancer survivors. This implied that the illness associated with the
employment gap was cancer, though this was not stated explicitly.
We chose cancer because cancer treatment is more likely to cause an employee to stop
working, causing an employment gap. Cancer patients who receive a good post-treatment
prognosis can return to the labor market with the comparable level of productivity as work-
ers with no poor health history. Cancer is also perceived to be onset-uncontrollable, which
prevents employers from forming inferences about productivity from the diagnosis. The pos-
sibility of relapse is also a concern for job applicants with cancer history. Further, health
insurance costs for employers are likely to increase, since previous episodes of cancer are
treated as a pre-existing condition that raise premiums.
A re´sume´ in treatment group 3 contained an employment gap that is comparably long
with treatment group 2. However, no explanation is provided for the employment gap in
the re´sume´ and cover letter. The employer, then, was free to assume the underlying reason
behind the applicant’s spell of joblessness.
In order to provide a signal of one’s health issues in the re´sume´ of treatment group 2,
17The explanation is necessary to prevent employers from assuming that the applicant is not readily
available for work or prone to job-hopping.
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we indicated that the applicant is a Member/Organizer of a cancer survivor group. To bal-
ance the three groups, we also assigned an alternative activity in the interest section of the
re´sume´s of treatment group 1 and treatment group 3. The applicant is either a volunteer for
the “Watch the Wild” program or is interested in drawing, painting and running.
We chose common first names in 1990 and last names that were most likely to signal that
the applicant was Caucasian to prevent any name-based employment discrimination from
influencing the results. For females, we used Jessica Smith, Ashley Johnson and Rachel
Miller. For males, we chose Joshua Smith, Andrew Johnson and Ryan Miller. Each name
was assigned a corresponding telephone number and email address. To easily track the call-
back, we assigned the name, a corresponding telephone number and e-mail address based on
the treatment type. Those who were assigned treatment 1, for example, were assigned the
name Rachel Miller and the corresponding email address and telephone number. The email
addresses were all gmail accounts. We used Vumber to get three online telephone numbers
by city, one for each treatment group. These did not appear any different than regular phone
numbers to the employer, but had the benefit that the calls and voicemails were recorded
in an online account and no physical phones were required. Residential addresses on the
re´sume´s were selected carefully to ensure that they were realistic. We used Zillow.com to get
real addresses but we changed the housing/apartment number/letters to generate fictitious
addresses.
Since we targeted jobs that required 6 years or less of experience, we designed the work
histories such that the total years of experience was about 6 years. Each re´sume´ was designed
such that the applicant had two jobs, no unemployment since high school graduation, but
were currently not employed. We created job histories by first randomly assigning the length
of contemporary unemployment. As mentioned above, the length of the employment gap is
conditional on the treatment assignment. We derived the end-dates of the last job by sub-
tracting the length of contemporary unemployment from the date the re´sume´ was planned
to be sent. We then randomly assigned the tenure in the last job (12, 24 or 36 months)
which then determined the start date of the last job and the end date of the first job. We
assigned the tenure in the second job such that the number of years of work experience in
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the first and second job added up to about 6 years. The tenure in the first job determined
the start date of the first job and the date of high school graduation.
We collected a sample of acceptable job histories from real re´sume´s downloaded in job
search sites. Based on these histories, we selected three options for the following fields for
each type of job: first job and job responsibilities, and second job and job responsibilities.
We randomly assigned the first and second job to the re´sume´s in each triplet. As in Neumark
et al. (2015), we followed a defined profile of responsibility, showing a progression of jobs
from lower to higher-level jobs.18 We added employer names and addresses to each job on
our final job histories. We used employers that were active at the time and in the region
listed.
We designated half the re´sume´s to be high skilled (or high quality), and half to be low
skilled. This would enable us to see if the employment consequences of illness-related gaps
vary by quality. We combined the measures used by Kroft et al. (2013) and Neumark et al.
(2015) to define a measure of quality for each re´sume´. All low-quality re´sume´s had typo-
graphical errors and had no additional signals of productivity/skills. We had three types
of high quality re´sume´s and each type of high quality re´sume´ had different additional sig-
nals of productivity. High quality type 1 re´sume´ had an extra level of education, additional
proficiency such as proficiency in Quickbooks software and indicated fluency in Spanish as
a second language. An extra level of education means that if the job required high school
completion, we listed an associate degree or if the job required an associate degree, we listed
a bachelor degree. High quality type 2 re´sume´s had acquired a certificate, an “Employee
of the Month” award and did not have typographical error. The third high quality re´sume´
had academic honors, notable achievement in previous work and had an an additional skill
different from the additional skill of type 1 high quality re´sume´s. All the re´sume´s in a triplet
were of same quality.
We created three re´sume´ templates. Templates were randomly assigned to each re´sume´
18For example, in retail sales, the first job starts with the lower responsibility job like a cashier position and
then the applicant works his/her way through becoming sales associate (hoping to step up to management
positions). For administrative assistants, workers start as a receptionist before working their way to an
administrative officer position.
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created. There are no same templates used in a triplet to prevent the employers from de-
tecting the experiment. For each job ad, the re´sume´ randomizer assigned whether the triplet
would be all male or all female.
For each city, we selected universities and corresponding degrees, community colleges
and corresponding degrees, and high schools by city listed on each re´sume´. We selected
universities that do not fall on the tier 1 to tier 3 categories defined by Hersch (2014). We
randomly assigned these based on the education levels. To be consistent with our story that
the treatment 1 applicant just moved from Seattle, we always assigned a school from Seattle
for treatment group 1.
Once the re´sume´s were generated, we converted the files to PDF formats. We named the
files based on the name or initials of the applicant. We made sure that the filename style
differs within triplet (e.g. “Rachel Miller”, “R.Miller”, or “Miller, Rachel”) to minimize
chances of detecting the experiment. Appendix A provides a sample re´sume´ and cover letter
for each of the treatment groups. The first two pages in Appendix A show a sample cover
letter and re´sume´ of a newly unemployed applicant. The next two pages show a sample
cover letter and re´sume´ of an applicant with an illness-related employment gap. These are
followed by a sample cover letter and re´sume´ of an applicant with an unexplained gap. In
sending the re´sume´s, we randomly assigned the order by which the re´sume´s were sent. For
each triplet, the second re´sume´ is sent at least a day after the first re´sume´ was sent. We
recorded the day the re´sume´ was sent in the database.
We measured whether a given re´sume´ elicits a callback, textback or e-mailback for an
interview. For each phone, text or e-mail response, we used the content of the message left
by the employer (name of the applicant, company name, telephone number for contact) to
match the response to the corresponding re´sume´/job ad pair.19 We defined a callback as a
personalized phone or e-mail contact by a potential employer. Usually the callback was a re-
quest for an interview, but employers also contacted applicants asking for more information
or stated that they have a few questions. After hearing from employers, we sent a message
19Any attempt by employers to contact applicants via postal mail cannot be measured in our experiment
since the addresses are fictitious.
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to them that the applicant is no longer available for the job.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy consists of comparing the average callback rates across treatment
groups and conducting various regression analyses to analyze the data we gathered from
the experiment. Our regression analyses start with checking whether our results are consis-
tent with previous studies showing that contemporaneous employment gaps adversely affect
employment prospects. To do this, we estimate the following equation:
Cjk = α + δGjk + R
′
jkΓ + E
′
kΛ + jk (1.10)
where Cjk is a callback indicator that equals 1 if applicant j who applied for job k re-
ceived an invitation to a job interview, Gjk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if applicant
j who applied for job k has an employment gap (i.e. illness-related employment gap or an
unexplained employment gap), R is vector of re´sume´ attributes and E is a vector of em-
ployer/job advertisement attributes.20 Given that the re´sume´ characteristics are randomized
across treatment groups, δ gives the unbiased estimate of the impact of having any employ-
ment gap on the callback rate relative to the newly unemployed since the omitted variable
is the dummy variable for the newly unemployed. The vectors Γ and Λ provide the effects
of re´sume´ and job advertisement attributes on the callback probability, respectively.
Our main goal in this paper is to analyze the effect of explaining an illness-related em-
ployment gap on workers’ likelihood of being invited to a job interview. Thus the next thing
we do is to estimate the following equation where instead of pooling all employment gaps
into one variable, we separately estimate the effect of each type of employment gap:
Cjk = α + β1Ijk + β2Ujk + R
′
jkΓ + E
′
kΛ + jk (1.11)
20R includes dummy variables for tenure, re´sume´ quality, re´sume´ template, order of sending within the
triplet, gender of the applicant etc. E includes dummy variables for occupation, required education level and
experience, full-time jobs, commission-based jobs, employer-sponsored health insurance, physical require-
ments and location of the job.
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Ijk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if applicant j who applied for job k has an illness-
related employment gap, Ujk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if applicant j who applied
for job k has an unexplained employment gap and the rest of the variables are the same as
in Equation 1.10. Given that the re´sume´ characteristics are randomized across treatment
groups, β1 gives the unbiased estimate of the mean impact of explaining an illness-related
employment gap relative to the hiring rate of the newly unemployed and β2 gives the unbiased
estimate of the mean impact of not explaining an illness-related employment gap relative
to the hiring outcome of the newly unemployed. Again, the omitted variable is the dummy
variable for newly unemployed.
As a robustness check, we estimate Equation 1.11 using OLS estimation as well as probit
estimation (and provide marginal effects). Moreover, we estimate the following fixed effects
model to control for fixed effects at the job ad level:
Cjk = α + β1Ijk + β2Ujk + R
′
jkΓ + µk + jk (1.12)
where µk represents the fixed effect of k
th job.
Since a small sample of the re´sume´s that were assigned an illness-related gap and unex-
plained gap have an employment gap of more than 20 months, it also informative to modify
and estimate Equations 1.10 to 1.12 to include an additional dummy variable for the em-
ployment gap that lasted for more than 20 months. The coefficient of this additional variable
can be interpreted as the mean impact of having more than 20 months in gap, given that
the applicant has either an illness-related gap or unexplained gap. This coefficient tells us if
having a longer employment gap matters once we control for more information on the gap.
1.5 Results
In this section, we present the overall descriptive statistics and then turn to the results.
Column 1 of Table 1.1 presents the overall callback rate for the sample. Included in brack-
ets under each rate is the number of re´sume´s sent in that cell. We sent a total of 3,771
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re´sume´s to 1,257 job ads. The overall callback rate is 25.5 percent. Unlike the Deming
et al. (2016a), we find that the callback rates did not differ between low and high quality
re´sume´s. The callback rate is higher for female-sounding names compared to male-sounding
names. Applications sent to sales jobs received higher callbacks compared to administrative
and accounting assistant jobs.
In the following subsections, we compare the callback rates among treatment groups and
subgroups and discuss the regression results and interpretation.
1.5.1 Comparing the Mean Callback Rates
Column 2 to 4 of Table 1.1 show the average callback rate of applicants who are newly
unemployed, with illness-related gaps and with unexplained employment gaps. Overall,
there is evidence of negative duration dependence. Row 1 shows that 27.4 percent of the
newly unemployed applicants received a callback compared to the average callback rate of
24.5 percent for applicants with employment gap (illness-related or unexplained). This holds
true by type of quality, gender and occupation.
When employers are given more information about the type of employment gap, they ap-
pear to consider this additional information in their callback decisions. Comparing columns
3 and 4, we see that the average callback is lower for applicants with an unexplained employ-
ment gap (23.3 percent) compared to applicants with an explained illness-related employment
gap (25.6 percent). This represents a difference in callback rates of 2.3 percentage points, or
9 percent reduction relative to the average callback rate of 25.5 percent. Except for low qual-
ity type re´sume´s and accounting jobs, the observation of lower callback rates for unexplained
gap can be seen in most sub-groups in Table 1.1 .
As in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), we tabulate the distribution of callbacks at the
firm or triplet level. In each of the cells in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.2, the first row indicates
the firm’s callback strategy, Ck = {cn,k, ci,k, cu,k} where cn,k, ci,k, cu,k ∈ {0, 1} and cs,k = 1
means the kth firm made a callback to the applicant with signal s and cs,k = 0 means the k
th
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firm did not call that applicant with signal s back.21 The second and third rows under each
cells in columns 2 and 3 respectively contain the percentage and the number of firms with
row 1 callback strategy. Equal treatment occurs when either no applicant gets called back or
all the types of applicants in a triplet receive a callback. The newly unemployed applicant is
favored when either only the newly unemployed gets called back, or the newly unemployed
is one of the two applicants in the triplet who received a callback. Similarly, the applicant
with an illness-related employment (unexplained employment) gap is favored when either
only the applicant with an illness-related employment (unexplained employment) gets called
back, or the applicant with an illness-related employment (unexplained employment) is one
of the two applicants in the triplet who received a callback.
In column 1 of Table 1.2, we report the percentage and number of firms that showed
equal treatment and the same statistics of firms who favored each treatment group. Equal
treatment occurs for about 77.2 percent of the ads but most of that is due to the high
fraction of ads for which no callbacks are recorded (62.9 percent of the ads). Approximately,
14 percent of job ads call all the applicants in the triplet. Newly unemployed applicants
are favored by 13.2 percent of the employers. Applicants with an explained illness-related
gap, on the other hand, are favored by only 11.4 percent of employers while applicants
with unexplained employment gap were the least favored with only 9.1 percent of employers
favoring this group.
Using the test of proportion, we test the null hypotheses that there is symmetry in : 1)
favoring of newly unemployed over applicants with an illness-related gap (Ho : nF = iF );
2) favoring of newly unemployed over applicants with an unexplained gap (Ho : nF = uF );
and 3) favoring of applicants with an illness-related gap over applicants with an unexplained
gap (Ho : iF = uF ). Given a p − value of 0.169, we do not reject Ho : nF = iF which
suggests that the difference between the fraction of employers favoring newly unemployed
and the fraction of employers favoring applicants with illness-related gap is not statistically
different from each other. However, we reject the Ho : nF = uF and Ho : iF = uF
21For example, callback strategy, Ck = {cn,k, ci,k, cu,k} = {1, 1, 0} means that for triplet k, the employer
called the applicants with signals n (no gap) and i (illness-related employment gap) and did not call the
applicant with signal u (unexplained employment gap).
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Table 1.1: Mean Callback Rates by Type of Employment Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Newly Unemployed Illness-related gap Unexplained gap
Overall 25.5 27.4 25.6 23.3
[3771] [1257] [1257] [1257]
Low Quality 25.5 26.5 23.8 26.2
[1956] [652] [652] [652]
High Quality 25.4 28.4 25.0 22.8
[1815] [605] [605] [605]
Male 23.3 24.6 23.6 21.8
[2025] [675] [675] [675]
Female 27.9 30.8 28.0 25.1
[1746] [582] [582] [582]
Retail 36.0 37.9 37.0 33.0
[1566] [522] [522] [522]
Administrative Assistant Jobs 18.2 19.5 18.0 17.0
[1200] [400] [400] [400]
Accounting Assistant Jobs 17.8 20.6 15.8 17.0
[1005] [335] [335] [335]
Note: The number of re´sume´s sent in each particular group is provided in the brackets.
because the test gives p− values of 0.001 and 0.057, respectively. Rejecting Ho : nF = uF
suggests that there is statistical difference between the rate by which employers favor the
newly unemployed relative to the rate by which employers favor applicants with unexplained
employment gap. Rejecting Ho : iF = uF suggests that there is statistical difference is
also observed if we compare the rate by which employers favor applicants with illness-related
gaps and the rate by which employers favor applicants with unexplained employment gaps.
1.5.2 Regression Results
In this subsection, we present the regression results of the empirical models represented by
Equations 1.10 to 1.12. Our main results show that applicants with explained illness-related
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Table 1.2: Distribution of Firms’ Callback Strategy, Ck = {cn,k, ci,k, cu,k}
Equal Treatment {0, 0, 0} {1, 1, 1}
77.2 62.9 14.2
[970] [791] [179]
Newly Unemployed Favored (nF) {1, 0, 0) {1, 1, 0} {1, 0, 1}
13.2 5.3 4.8 3.1
[166] [67] [60] [39]
Illness-related Employment Gap Favored (iF) {0, 1, 0} {1, 1, 0} {0, 1, 1}
11.4 3.7 4.8 2.9
[143] [46] [60] [37]
Unexplained Employment Gap Favored (uF) {0, 0, 1} {1, 0, 1} {0, 1, 1}
9.1 3.0 3.1 2.9
[114] [38] [39] [37]
Note: The first line in each of the cells in columns 2 to 4 represents the callback strategy of the firm,
{cn,k, ci,k, cu,k} while the first line in column 1 sums up the relevant callback strategies to determine the
share of firms that showed equal treatment and unequal treatment. Across all cells in the table, the second
line is the percentage of firms while the third row contains the number of firms.
employment gaps receive higher callbacks than otherwise identical applicants who offer no
explanation for the gap.
Our experiment finds negative duration dependence that is consistent with studies closely
related to our paper. Table 1.3 presents a regression analyses of the effect of having a con-
temporaneous employment gap (relative to newly unemployed applicants) on the probability
of getting hired. These estimates pool Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 together. Columns 1 to
3 are estimated using OLS estimation, probit estimation22 and linear estimation with fixed
effects, respectively. Relative to applicants who are newly unemployed, the effect of having
an employment gap that is at least 7 months is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level. The callback rate is reduced by 12 percent (0.03/0.255) for applicants with any type
of employment gap. The results are robust across linear specifications (with and without job
advertisement fixed effects) and non-linear specification.
22Coefficients reflect marginal effects.
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A small proportion of workers were assigned employment gaps of more than 20 months.
We include an additional dummy equal to 1 when the gap is greater than 20 months in
columns 4 to 6. The changes in the coefficient of the employment gap are small and not
significant and the coefficient of the additional dummy is also not significant. As a result,
we see no evidence that employment gaps longer than 12 months further reduce employ-
ment prospects. This is consistent with the results of Kroft et al. (2013) and Eriksson and
Rooth (2014) which suggest that callbacks decline sharply for mid-long spells (up to around
9 months) but is flat for unemployment durations thereafter. After a length threshold is
reached, additional length of employment gaps does not explain the adverse effect of em-
ployment gaps.
Table 1.3: The Effect of Having an Employment Gap on the Callback Rate
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Callback Dummy
Employment Gap -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Gap Duration>20 0.066 0.059 -0.023
(0.040) (0.037) (0.034)
OLS X X
Probit X X
Fixed Effects: X X
(Job Ads)
Callback Rate Ave. (%) 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
Observations 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771
R-squared 0.090 0.012 0.091 0.012
Number of Job Ads 1,257 1,257
Note: The dependent variable is the callback dummy. Control variables include dummy variables for tenure,
re´sume´ quality, re´sume´ template, order of sending within the triplet, gender of the applicant, for occupation
type, required education level and experience, full-time jobs, commission-based jobs, employer-sponsored
health insurance, physical requirements and location of the job. Columns 1 to 3 were estimated without
controlling for gaps greater than 20 months. Columns 4 to 6 include a dummy controlling for gaps greater
than 20 months. Columns 2 and 5 give the results of a probit regression using dprobit command in Stata
12. The coefficients reported in these columns (2 and 5) are estimated marginal changes in the probability
for estimated discrete changes for the dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered at the job vacancy level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
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To fully control for re´sume´ and job characteristics, we estimate Equations 1.11 and 1.12.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.4 show estimates of Equation 1.11 using OLS and probit while
column 3 shows the linear estimation result controlling for the fixed effects at the job ad
level (Equation 1.12). The coefficients of the illness-related gap and the unexplained gap are
negative and significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively, indicating that appli-
cants with any type of employment gap have worse employment prospects relative to newly
unemployed applicants.
In order to answer our main research question, we compare the magnitude of the coeffi-
cients for an illness-related gap and an unexplained gap to show if the effect of explaining a
gap mitigates its negative effect on employment. Indeed, relative to the newly unemployed,
applicants with an unexplained gap receive fewer callbacks (4.2 percentage points less) than
the those with an illness-related employment gap (1.9 percentage points less). Relative to
the mean callback rate (25.5 percent), an illness-related employment gap reduces the call-
back rate by approximately 7 percent. An unexplained employment gap, however, reduces
the callback rate by 16 percent. Results from the F-test reject the null hypothesis that the
marginal effect of the two types of employment gaps are the same. These results are robust
across several specifications, including controlling for the job ad fixed effects. Our main
results show that applicants with explained illness-related employment gaps fare better in
attracting callbacks than otherwise identical applicants that offer no explanation for the gap.
The results and the theoretical framework presented in Section 1.2 suggests that employ-
ers are not as concerned about the cost of having poor health, h, as they are about to the cost
of hiring workers with unexplained gap (i.e. lower expected productivity).23 In a model with
heterogeneous workers and uncertainty, employers do not directly observe productivity of job
applicants. Given a positive correlation of general employment gaps and low productivity,
firms take observed employment gaps as signals of productivity.
23The theoretical framework in this paper can provide explanation to the results of Baert et al. (2016)
which show that the mean callback rate of the recently unemployed candidate is 14.2% compared to the
10.1% average callback of applicants who have unexplained employment gap and the 9.4% callback rate of
applicants with employment gaps because of depression implies that employers. The framework implies that
the healthcare cost associated with mental illness is not significantly higher than the reduction in productivity
associated with those who have unexplained employment gaps.
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Table 1.4: The Effect of Having an Explained Illness-related Gap and an Unexplained Gap
on the Callback Rate
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Callback Dummy
Illness-related Gap -0.019* -0.019* -0.018* -0.022* -0.022* -0.019*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Unexplained Gap -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.038***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Gap Duration>20 0.074 0.069 -0.062
(0.058) (0.055) (0.047)
Unexplained Gap x -0.017 -0.019 0.075
Gap Duration >20 (0.085) (0.068) (0.068)
F (Illness-related 0. 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.046 0.044 0.090
= Unexplained)
Ave. Callback Rate 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
OLS X X
Probit X X
Fixed Effects: X X
Job Ad
Observations 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771
R-squared 0.091 0.013 0.092 0.014
Number of Job Ads 1,257 1,257
Notes: The dependent variable is the callback dummy. Control variables includes dummy variables for
tenure, re´sume´ quality, re´sume´ template, order of sending within the triplet, gender of the applicant, for
occupation type, required education level and experience, full-time jobs, commission-based jobs, employer-
sponsored health insurance, physical requirements and location of the job. Columns 1 to 3 were estimated
without controlling for a gap duration greater than 20 months. Columns 4 to 6 include a dummy controlling
for gaps greater than 20 months. Columns 2 and 5 give the results of a probit regression using dprobit
command in Stata 12. The coefficients reported in these columns (2 and 5) are estimated marginal changes
in the probability for an estimated discrete change. The F(Illness-related Gap = Unexplained Gap) provides
the F-statistic needed to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of an illness-related gap is equal to the
coefficient of the unexplained gap. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the job
vacancy level: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.5.3 The Role of the Physical Requirements of the Job and Employer-
Sponsored Insurance
To further explore our results, we analyze how job-related physical requirements and employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) affect the relative callback probability of each treatment group.
We do this in order to determine if any evidence exists for possible alternative mechanisms
underlying our results.
First, employers might take an illness-related gap as a signal for weaker physical ability
that may interfere with current or future productivity. To test the influence of perceived
physical limitations, we use data from the job advertisement on the physical requirements
of the job to create a dummy variable, “Physical Requirements”, which is equal to 1 if the
job advertisement explicitly mentions that the job entails physical strength such as standing
and lifting objects. We interact this variable with the treatment group dummies.
Table 1.5 shows that the coefficient of the interaction of an illness-related gap and physical
requirements of the job is negative but not significant. However, the size of the coefficient
(-0.013 for column 1)is large relative to the impact of an illness employment gap in jobs
without a physical requirement (-0.021 for column 1). By contrast, there is no additional
callback reduction in jobs with physical requirements for those with unexplained gaps.
Second, employers that offer employer-sponsored insurance may want to avoid applicants
with an illness-related gap because of their higher expected medical costs. We use data
from the job advertisement on the offer of employer-sponsored insurance to create a dummy
variable, “Health Insurance”, which is equal to 1 if the job advertisement explicitly mentions
that the employer provides employer-sponsored insurance. Table 1.5 shows that the coeffi-
cient of the interaction of the dummy variable for illness-related gaps and “Health Insurance”
is positive and not significant. The coefficient of the interaction of the dummy variable for
unexplained gaps and “Health Insurance” is negative and significant at 10 percent level.
Neither estimate suggests that the offer of health insurance negatively affects job prospects
of applicants with poor health histories. However, our ability to make a stronger conclusion
about the role of employer sponsored insurance in explaining our results is tempered by two
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Table 1.5: Job Characteristics and Effect of Employment Gaps on Callback Rate
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Callback Dummy
Illness-related Gap -0.021* -0.021* -0.018 -0.025* -0.026** -0.022*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Unexplained Gap -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.033** -0.034** -0.025*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Health Insurance -0.012 -0.014 -0.000 -0.003
(0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
Physical -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021
Requirements (0.046) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033)
Illness-related Gap x -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
Physical (0.043) (0.038) (0.043)
Unexplained Gap x -0.000 0.001 0.013
Physical (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
Illness-related Gap 0.011 0.014 0.009
x Health Insurance (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Unexplained Gap -0.047* -0.045* -0.050*
x Health Insurance (0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
OLS X X
Probit X X
Fixed Effects: X X
Job Ad
Observations 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771 3,771
R-squared 0.092 0.014 0.092 0.017
Number of Job Ads 1,257 1,257
The dependent variable is the callback dummy. Control variables includes dummy variables for
tenure, re´sume´ quality, re´sume´ template, order of sending within the triplet, gender of the applicant,
for occupation type, required education level and experience, full-time jobs, commission-based jobs,
employer-sponsored health insurance, physical requirements and location of the job. Columns 3
and 6 gives the results of a probit regression using dprobit command in Stata 12. The coefficients
reported in columns 3 and 6 are estimated marginal changes in the probability for estimated discrete
changes for the dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at
the job vacancy level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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important weaknesses. Firstly, we rely on explicit reports of insurance availability in a job
advertisement, and thus might misclassify some jobs that offer insurance but do not advertise
as such. Secondly, the offer of health insurance is strongly correlated with firm size, which
may confound the estimates if firm size affects perception of gaps for reasons unrelated to
health costs.
In summary, our results on the effects of the presence of physical requirements of the
job and employer-sponsored insurance suggest that these factors do not play a significant
role in determining the differential impact of an unexplained gap and an illness-related gap.
However, we exercise caution in ruling out such factors altogether, as our study was not
specifically powered to test these hypotheses.
1.6 Conclusion
As of 2015, nearly one-third of the the US population suffered from some chronic health
condition. Unsurprisingly, a large portion of potential workers (nearly 13 million adults in
2014) exited the labor force as a result of illness or disability. The loss of productivity from
these workers who exited the labor market adds to the overall cost of health problems to
society. One way to minimize the cost is to ensure that workers with poor health history,
but the ability to return to work, are able to do so. However, their employment gaps may
adversely affect their employment prospects. Further, the recent recession has refocused on
how increased spells of joblessness affect the prospect of re-entry into the workforce.
Our paper aims to shed light on the relative prospects of job applicants with different
types of gaps in their employment records. We compare the effects of illness-related em-
ployment gaps, no employment gaps and unexplained employment gaps. We have two main
findings. First, job applicants with illness-related employment gaps have slightly worse call-
back rates than newly unemployed applicants, which indicates some degree of unemployment
stigma, even for those who report being forced out of work for illness-related reasons. Sec-
ond, applicants with explained illness-related employment gaps fare substantially better in
attracting callbacks than otherwise identical applicants that offer no explanation for the gap.
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We provide a theoretical model showing how employers may rank workers with differ-
ent types of employment gaps. In this model, heterogeneous workers and employers do not
directly observe productivity of job applicants. Firms, however, can observe employment
gaps and take these as signals of productivity and healthcare costs. When the cost of hiring
workers with health shocks is lower than the cost of hiring workers with lower expected
productivity, we show that employers may prefer to hire job applicants with illness-related
employment gaps over applicants with unexplained gaps.
Our paper is limited to the effects on callback rates and cannot provide evidence on
the impact on final job-finding rates. Despite these limitations, we believe that our study
provides insights on employer behavior that underlie the documented employment gap. In
particular, our model and results suggest that the productivity signalling value of long spells
of joblessness likely play a larger role than other explanations, such as human capital depre-
ciation, in the increased difficulty faced by these workers in finding a new job.
Future work can determine whether the effects of health-related employment gaps found
here differ across types of physical illness. Future work might also explore the behavioral
transmission mechanisms underlying the effects of illness-related employment gaps on em-
ployment prospects. For example, are illness-related gaps that are perceived to be caused by
controllable factors treated differently from those perceived to be caused by uncontrollable
factors? We are also unable to determine the extent to which the relatively favorable job
market conditions at the time of our study influenced the large relative penalty faced by
applicants with unexplained gaps. A simple extension of the model may suggest a more
strongly negative signal from an unexplained gap in high employment settings than in times
of widespread unemployment.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Post-Baccalaureate
Certificates on Job Search: Results
from a Correspondence Study
2.1 Introduction
There has been a dramatic growth in the receipt of post-baccalaureate certificates.1 As shown
in Table 2.1, data from the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) show
that certification completion reached more than one million in 2014, which is 91.7 percent
increase from 1999. Certificates were about a quarter of all post-secondary awards in 2014.2
Although most of these certificates are sub-baccalaureate, post-baccalaureate certificates
constitute one of the fastest-growing areas in higher education. Post-baccalaureate certifi-
cates registered the highest percentage growth at 178 percent in the last 15 years (1999
to 2014) compared to 88 percent growth rate for sub-baccalaureate certificates in the same
period. Post-baccalaureate certificates divert from traditional post-secondary programs in
1Post-baccalaureate certificates are interchangeable with the following terms: graduate certificate, grad-
uate diploma, certificate of graduate study (COGS), certificate of advanced graduate study (CAGS) and
professional development program.
2Bosworth (2010) and Carnevale et al. (2012) provide more detailed description on the landscape of
post-secondary certificate programs.
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that they tend to be short-term, highly specific and have more easily defined student objec-
tives. Post-baccalaureate programs are also often offered online which give the student more
flexibility.
The growth in post-baccalaureate certificate programs highlights the need to examine if
getting such certificate is beneficial in the job application process, especially given concerns
about the perceived usefulness of graduate certificates. To date, little is known about the
actual benefits associated with such programs. Most of the research done on the value of
certificates focuses on the returns of sub-baccalaureate certificates. In this paper, we fill this
gap in the literature by focusing on post-baccalaureate certificates. Specifically, our goal is
to establish the causal relationship between having a post-baccalaureate certificate and the
chances of getting a request for an interview.
Table 2.1: Certificate Completion, in thousands
% Change
1999 2004 2009 2012 2014 1999-2009 1999-2014
Sub-baccalaureate 546 720 840 1,030 1,007 53.6 88.4
Post-baccalaureate 19 33 47 55 57 145.4 178.4
TOTAL 566 754 887 1,085 1,065 56.7 91.7
Notes: Post-baccalaureate includes post-master.
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Completions Survey.
To better understand post-baccalaureate certificate programs, Patterson (1999) surveyed
deans, associate deans of graduate schools, and other graduate school officers affiliated with
the Council of Graduate Schools (CGS) and the University Continuing Education Associ-
ation (UCEA). The surveys show that post-baccalaureate certificates are more common at
research and doctoral universities than at master’s and bachelor’s institutions. Most of the
certificate programs offered are in the business, health, and information science disciplines.
The admissions process for each type of program varies considerably. These certificates may
act as a stepping stone to a graduate degree as the graduate credits may be transferable to
a master’s or doctoral program.
For background information on business certificates specifically, we spoke with someone
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who works in a business school at a large, research university. Business certificates are
aimed at students who majored in fields not related to business as undergraduates. Often,
the business certificate is a way to try out whether an MBA program is right for the student,
as some of the courses can transfer over to an MBA program. There is variation in how
long students wait after graduating with a bachelor’s degree to enroll. Since certificates
are non-degree seeking programs, the students are not eligible for financial aid unless they
are also enrolled in a degree seeking program. Most enrollees are working full-time or are
full-time students in other degree seeking programs. The school did not keep track of post-
certificate outcomes such as getting a promotion, getting a new job or getting a raise. The
representative said that non-degree granting programs are not required to keep track of what
happens after the program ends.
Notwithstanding the increasing popularity, there are concerns about the perceived use-
fulness of graduate certificates. The first concern pertains to the lack of a clear definition of a
post-baccalaureate certificate (Houston and Marksbury (2003)). The term “degree” – asso-
ciate’s, bachelor’s, master’s or doctor’s – is used to recognize a study over known time, known
depth (subjects studied) and known standards while “certificates” is a less clear term. Some
universities also issue certificates for persons who receive continuing education unit (CEU)
while other certificates are issued for non-credit courses, for undergraduate coursework or
for professional service. Also, the term certificate is often confused with the term “certifica-
tion.”3 Thus the meaning of a post-baccalaureate certificate to an employer may be unclear
(Patterson (1999)).
This lack of standardization is further exacerbated by the lack of quality control in the
market for certificates. Due to the profitability of such programs the field has attracted nu-
merous for-profit firms and encouraged aggressive marketing of certificate programs. Deming
et al. (2012) look at outcomes of for-profit students and find that they are more likely to com-
plete short-term programs like certificates but have higher unemployment and lower earnings
six years after entering the program. Deming et al. (2016b) use a correspondence study to
3Normally, universities certify that students have demonstrated competence in a certain discipline, and
in some cases, the document attesting to this fact is called a certificate. (In other cases, the document may
be called a “degree,” “diploma,” or even, colloquially, a “sheepskin.”) (Patterson (1999))
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find that for people applying for health care related jobs that have no certificate requirement,
having a certificate from a for-profit college decreases the likelihood of a callback compared
to having a certificate from a public institution. Thus, if students are getting credentials
from for-profit schools, they may have little value in the labor market.
On the other hand, post-baccalaureate certificates may work as a signal in the labor
market that the worker is more productive than a similar worker without a certificate. Gaulke
(2017) shows that people who enroll in post-baccalaureate training are quite different from
those who do not enroll. An unordered multinomial logit model finds that higher ASVAB
score (a proxy for ability) is associated with an increase in the odds of enrolling in a post-
baccalaureate program versus not enrolling with a p-value of .054. Even within majors,
there tends to be a pattern of those with post-baccalaureate training program having higher
average ASVAB scores than those who do not enroll. The main exception to this pattern
in the health field. However, in that paper, training programs do not include business
certificates due to the lack of popularity at the time of the surveys.
To address the concern that people who self-select into the post-baccalaureate certificate
program are different from those who do not, this paper uses a correspondence study. Ficti-
tious re´sume´s are sent to prospective employers to estimate the effect of a post-baccalaureate
certificate on the probability of receiving a callback for a job. A correspondence study allows
us to control for observable characteristics while randomly assigning whether a candidate
has a post-baccalaureate certificate or not. We find that for jobs posted in San Francisco,
having a certificate actually significantly decreases the likelihood of a callback. In Los Ange-
les and New York, there is not significant effect from having the certificate. However, there
are two reasons why this might occur. The first is that certificates do not benefit those
looking for a new job. The other is a typographical error in which the expected date of the
certificate is May 2016 instead of May 2017 which may have harmed application of those
with certificates.4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we give more detail
on the related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe the experimental design. Section 2.4
4Future work, which fixes this error will help us provide clearer answer.
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reports the results and interpretation. Section 2.5 concludes and provides suggestions for
future studies.
2.2 Related Literature
While there has been a paucity of work related to post-baccalaureate certificates, research
on the labor market effects of pre-baccalaureate certificates has been done both nationally
and at the state level. Pre-baccalaureate certificates are awarded to those individuals with
at least a high school diploma, but less than a baccalaureate degree by community colleges,
technical institutes, proprietary and vocational schools.
There are inconsistent findings at the national level. Research before the year 2000
used either the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72),
the National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS) or the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) data to analyze the effects of certificates on earnings or wages. Papers
that used NLS72 or NALS found certificates yield zero returns (Grubb (1995), Hollenbeck
(1993), Rivera-Batiz (1998) and Surette (1997)). Meanwhile, research that used SIPP indi-
cate significant returns to sub-baccalaureate certificates (Grubb (1995) and Ryan (2005)).
Inconsistencies in results persist even with the use of the more recent longitudinal surveys
from the US Department of Education (Bailey et al. (2004) and Marcotte et al. (2005). Small
sample sizes and a lack of data on program length are concerns raised with this literature
(Bosworth (2010)).
In contrast to national level studies, the findings of some state-specific research studies
that have used administrative data (i.e. unemployment insurance records) are more consis-
tent. Some of these studies provide information on the value of programs by length and field
of study (Bosworth (2010)). Certificate attainment overall has a positive earnings results
(For example, see Friedlander (1996) for California and Jepsen et al. (2014) for Kentucky).
Field of study is a key determinant of labor market returns of certificates. Jacobson and
Mokher (2009) show that, in Florida, median earnings of certificate completers approximate
or even surpass median earnings for associate degree completers (especially those in pre-
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baccalaureate non-occupational fields who do not leverage their associate’s degree into a
bachelor’s degree). With administrative data providing information about program length
and program of study, researchers have found that long-term certificates are more valuable
in the labor market than short-term certificates. In addition to wage benefits, Jepsen et al.
(2014) also show that certificates were found to contribute positively to the probability of
employment.
Even with administrative data, self-selection concerns have hampered the ability to make
causal conclusions. More recently, research on the effects of education credentials on the labor
market outcomes of workers have used re´sume´-based correspondence studies to circumvent
these problems. In these field experiments, researchers prepare fictitious re´sume´s and apply
to real jobs online. The characteristics of job applicants including academic credentials are
randomly assign in the re´sume´ so that on average, the re´sume´s are identical except for their
assignment of education attainment. Darolia et al. (2015) and Deming et al. (2016b) use this
method to examine how employers value job applicants with certificates (or degrees) from
for-profit colleges. The former does not show any significant effect of certificates while the
latter find that employers hiring for health jobs with no certificate or license requirements
(primarily medical assistant jobs) strongly prefer applicants with certificates from public
institutions, compared with applicants with a for-profit certificate or no credential at all.
2.3 Experimental Design
As described in the first essay, the correspondence study has been used to test for hiring
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, immigration, gender, sexual orientation and age.
Additionally, the method has been extended to identify hiring penalties associated with
motherhood, physical unfitness, obesity and criminal record.5 The method involves applying
to job vacancies by sending equally qualified re´sume´s whose only difference is a characteristic
5See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Arai et al. (2015), Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez (2014),
Baert et al. (2015), Carlsson and Rooth (2007), (Drydakis and Vlassis, 2010) and Neumark et al. (2015),
Correll et al. (2007), Rooth (2011), Rooth (2009) and Pager (2003).
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that signals membership to a group.6 This paper employs this methodology to study how
employers respond to a job applicant’s holding of a post-baccalaureate certificate compared
to applicants who have none.
While there are benefits to using an experimental design, there are downsides to our
approach as well. By using a correspondence study, we only learn about perceived benefits
to post-baccalaureate certificates instead of actual productivity gains. Additionally, we can
only compare callback rates and not rates of job offers. Also, our applicants are applying
for online job postings without using any networking contacts. While this may not be the
experience for every job candidate, Carnevale et al. (2014) report that there is better online
job ad coverage among high-skilled, white-collar jobs. Given that all of our applicants are
college educated, we believe the coverage rate should be a minor issue for this study. A 2015
survey by the Pew Research Center (Smith (2015)) found that 79 percent of individuals say
they used online resources and information in their latest job search and 34 percent said
that was their most valuable resource. Thus, we believe using online jobs postings will not
distort our findings.
That said, there are always external validity concerns with experiments. Our study
focuses on relatively new college graduates and thus does not apply to individuals with
longer work histories. Additionally, since our outcome of interest is a callback, the study
cannot make any conclusions regarding raises or promotions within a company in which a
person would not be applying online. Additionally, if certificates are valuable because they
help people who are self-employed or help people start their own businesses, that will not be
picked up in comparing callback rates.
The first phase of this experiment was implemented between January, 2017, and April,
2017. Over this period, we surveyed eligible employment ads from multiple online job boards.
We prepared a pool of re´sume´s, and for each job ad, we drew and sent a pair of fictitious
re´sume´s from our pool and sent them to employers. We then measured employers’ responses
to our fictitious job seekers’ application.7
6The experimental protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Kansas
State University.
7The experimental protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Kansas
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The first step in our experiment is surveying for eligible job ads. As in the first essay, we
chose the following occupations: managerial, clerical/administrative assistant and accounting
assistant jobs. We targeted these jobs for several reasons. First, these types of jobs do not
require complex skills and are fairly similar across firms which allow us to easily create
suitable generic re´sume´s. Second, there are enough numbers of available jobs in online job
boards in these fields to conduct a sufficiently powered study. We limited our sample to entry
job ads for fresh college graduates. We restricted our experiment to three cities: New York,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco. These cities were chosen based on geographic proximity
to certificate granting schools. We chose jobs that allowed direct uploads of re´sume´s to
apply. We eliminated any ad where applicants were asked to call or appear in person or that
required re´sume´s to be submitted to external websites. We recorded available information
about the job, including the date the job ad was posted, position, company name, company
address and job requirements (education level and skills required). We collected jobs and
sent re´sume´s by batch. More specifically, the size of a batch depends on the available jobs
at the particular time of data collection and ranges from about 30 to 50 jobs. We prepared
and sent the re´sume´s for one batch of job ads before collecting a new batch of job ads.
The next step is to prepare the re´sume´s. Using the re´sume´ randomizer developed by
Lahey and Beasley (2009), we first created our pool of re´sume´s by randomly assigning re´sume´
details, most importantly the treatment/control assignment, to each re´sume´.8 Each re´sume´
in the pool has a corresponding partner re´sume´ and the two of them constitute one pair.
Each re´sume´ in the pair either have a post-baccalaureate certificate or none. Re´sume´s that
were randomly assigned the post-baccalaureate certificate belong to the treatment group
while re´sume´s that were randomly assigned none belong to the control group. For each job
ad, a pair of re´sume´s is drawn and sent.9 By differing the presence of post-baccalaureate
certificate in each of the re´sume´s in each pair, we can identify the effects of post-baccalaureate
certificates on the employment prospects of job seekers. The rest of the details were randomly
State University. The protocol is closely patterned to the experimental design in the first chapter of this
dissertation.
8We exported these characteristics assignment to a spreadsheet, which was used as input to re´sume´
creation in Microsoft Word using the Mail Merge function.
9Accordingly, we have x pairs since we applied to x jobs.
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assigned to each re´sume´ and designed so that there would there would be no repetition of
exact details for each pair of re´sume´s and so that each treatment group is very similar on
average.
All of the re´sume´s in the pool indicated a completion of a bachelor’s degree from a uni-
versity. To not send any additional signals such as race or religious affiliation we focused
on public universities. We further restricted the schools to be ranked by the U.S. News and
World Reports as a top fifty to top one hundred and fifty national university. National uni-
versities should be well known, and the ranking restriction should reduce variation in callback
rates across the university of bachelor’s degree completion. We designed the assignment so
that 75 percent of the time, the re´sume´ would be assigned a university from the same state
as the location of the position advertised and 25 percent of the time a university outside the
state. We also designed the assignment of bachelor’s degree so that the distribution is close
to the distribution of degrees awarded in national surveys.
Since we targeted jobs that required 1 year or 2 years of experience, we designed the
work histories such that the total years of experience was aprroximately 2 years. Each
re´sume´ was designed such that the applicant has only one job and were employed at the
time of application. For each type of occupation (i.e. manager, accounting assistant or
administrative assistant), their current job was related to the job description. Tenure in
the applicant’s current (and sole) employment is either one or two years. This, in turn,
determined the year of graduation from college. For example, if the re´sume´ was assigned
a tenure of two years, the start date of the first job was two years before the current date
(when the job application was sent). Details in the skills and the objective career sections
were related to the position applied for and were randomly assigned across re´sume´s.
As in the first essay, we chose common first names in 1990 and last names that were most
likely to signal that the applicant was Caucasian to prevent any name-based employment
discrimination from influencing the results. For females, we used Jessica and Lisa. For males,
we chose Michael and Robert. Each name was assigned a corresponding telephone number
and email address. To easily track the callback, we assigned the name, a corresponding
telephone number and e-mail address based on the treatment type. Those who were assigned
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treatment, for example, were assigned the name Lisa and Robert and the corresponding email
address and telephone number. We again used Vumber to get two online telephone numbers
by city, one for each treatment group. These did not appear any different than regular phone
numbers to the employer, but had the benefit that the calls and voicemails were recorded
in an online account and no physical phones were required. Residential addresses on the
re´sume´s were selected carefully to ensure that they were realistic. We used Zillow.com to get
real addresses, but we changed the housing/apartment number/letters to generate fictitious
addresses. We created two re´sume´ templates. Templates were randomly assigned to each
re´sume´ created. The same template was not used in a pair to prevent the employers from
detecting the experiment. For each job ad, the re´sume´ randomizer assigned whether the pair
would be all male or all female.
Once the re´sume´s were generated, we converted the files to PDF formats. We named the
files based on the name or initials of the applicant. We made sure that the filename style
differs within pair to minimize chances of detecting the experiment. Appendiz B provides
a sample re´sume´ for each of the treatment groups. The first page in Appendix B show a
sample re´sume´ of an applicant without a certificate. The next page shows a sample re´sume´
of an applicant with a post-baccalaureate certificate. In sending the re´sume´s, we randomly
assigned the order by which the re´sume´s were sent. For each pair, the second re´sume´ is sent
at least a day after the first re´sume´ was sent. We recorded the day the re´sume´ was sent in
the database.
We measured whether a given re´sume´ receives a response from potential employers. For
each phone, text or e-mail response, we match the response to the corresponding re´sume´/job
ad pair based on the content of the message left by the employer (name of the applicant,
company name, telephone number for contact).10 As in the first experiment, we defined a
callback as a personalized phone or e-mail contact by a potential employer. Usually, the
callback was a request for an interview, but employers also contacted applicants asking for
more information or stated that they have a few questions. After hearing from employers,
10Response by employers via postal mail cannot be measured in our experiment since the residential
addresses are fictitious.
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we sent a message to them that the applicant is no longer available for the job.
2.4 Results
The descriptive statistics, overall and separately by city, are shown in Table 2.2. Note that,
while half of the re´sume´ pairs are women, less than half of the sample are women, due to
some jobs expiring either before any applications can be sent, or after the first application is
sent but before the second can be sent. The overall callback rate is 11.5 percent, with San
Francisco having the highest rate, at 18.6 percent.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All New York San Francisco Los Angeles
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Callback 0.115 0.086 0.186 0.102
(0.320) (0.280) (0.390) (0.302)
Female 0.468 0.475 0.466 0.464
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499)
Occupation
Manager 0.368 0.383 0.291 0.401
(0.482) (0.486) (0.455) (0.490)
Acct. Assist. 0.274 0.269 0.243 0.299
(0.446) (0.444) (0.429) (0.458)
Admin. Assist. 0.358 0.349 0.466 0.299
(0.480) (0.477) (0.499) (0.458)
City
New York 0.396
(0.489)
San Francisco 0.237
(0.425)
Los Angeles 0.368
(0.482)
Observations 2,088 826 494 768
Notes: Each observation is an application. Numbers represent fractions.
Table 2.3 shows the callback rate by the control group (no certificate) and the treatment
group (certificate), as well as by other groups. The main result is the overall difference in the
callback rates between the control and treatment groups: 12.5 percent for the no certificate
group, and 10.6 percent for the certificate group. In other words, job applicants with a
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Table 2.3: Callback Rate, No Certificate (Control) versus Certificate (Treatment), by Group
(1) (2)
No Certificate Certificate
mean mean
Total 0.125 0.106
Gender
Male 0.112 0.086
Female 0.139 0.129
City
New York 0.090 0.082
San Francisco 0.215 0.158
Los Angeles 0.104 0.099
Occupation
Manager 0.156 0.125
Admin. Assist. 0.131 0.096
Acct. Assist. 0.073 0.094
Observations 1,044 1,044
Notes: Each value is the callback rate of that group, which is the fraction
of applications that received a response from employers. Column (1) shows
callback rates for the group without a certificate (control), while column (2)
shows callback rates for the group with a certificate (treatment).
certificate are 1.9 percentage point less likely to receive a callback relative to job applicants
with no certificates. Given the overall rate of 11.5 percent, this represents a 16.5 percent
lower probability of a callback. Thus, it appears that post-baccalaureate certificates may, in
fact, be harmful to job seekers.
Table 2.3 also shows the callback rate by gender, city, and occupation, again separately
by control versus treatment groups. These results are also shown graphically in Figure 2.1.
The penalty for having a certificate is common across all groups, to various degrees, except
for the accounting assistant occupation, where a positive effect of having a certificate is
observed. The differences in the callback rates between the control and treatment groups
are 2.6 percentage points and 1.0 percentage points for men and women, respectively, which
indicates that the presence of a certificate appears to impact men’s callback rates more so
than women’s. In all cities, we observe that job applicants with certificates have a smaller
chance of receiving a call relative to those with no certificates. However, this difference is sig-
nificantly more pronounced in San Francisco (5.7 percentage points difference) compared to
the differences observed in Los Angeles (0.5 percentage point) and New York (0.8 percentage
point). The results are also different by occupation. We notice negative effects of certificates
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in managerial and administrative assistant jobs but a positive effect in accounting assistant
jobs.
An advantage of our methodology - sending pairs of re´sume´s to the same job ad - is
that it allows us to look at how frequently neither, both, or just one job applicant received
a callback, and whether that varies by certificate. In Table 2.4, we compare the relative
proportions of the following four groups of outcomes for each application pair: 1) neither
control nor treatment application received a callback; 2) only the control received a callback;
3) only the treatment received a callback; and 4) both treatment and control received a
callback. The most common outcome, at 83.1 percent, is neither application to receive a
callback. 6.2 percent of application pairs are in the final group, i.e. where both treatment and
control receive a callback. In the event of only a single callback in the pair (the middle two
groups), the application without the certificate is 40.9 percent more likely to have received
the callback than the application with the certificate. This result highlights the apparently
negative impact of holding a certificate on the probability of receiving a callback.
Figure 2.1: Callback Rate, No Certificate versus Certificate, by Group
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We more thoroughly test the effect of having a certificate on the probability of a callback
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by estimating a series of linear probability regressions of the following form:
Yiomc = β ∗ Certi +Xiomc ∗ ρ+ γo + λc + δm + αt + iomc (2.1)
where i refers to the individual, o refers to occupation, m refers to major, and c refers to city.
Yiomc equals one if the applicant received a callback, and zero otherwise, while Certi equals
one if the applicant is in the treatment group (certificate), and zero otherwise. Our main
outcome of interest is β which is the coefficient on having a post-baccalaureate certificate.
We also include controls for the month the job was posted, whether the application was the
first or second of the pair sent, the number of days between when the job ad was posted,
and the application was sent, undergraduate university, and undergraduate degree type.
The results are shown in Table 2.5. Consistent with the previous discussion, we see
evidence of a negative effect of having a post-baccalaureate certificate on the probability of
receiving a callback. Relative to the control group, the treatment group has a 2.4 percentage
point, and thus a 20.9 percent lower probability of receiving a callback. To test whether
this effect varies by gender, column (2) interacts the treatment variable (Certificate) with a
female dummy variable. While the interaction term is positive, suggesting that the penalty of
having a certificate is lower for women than men, the difference is insignificant at conventional
levels. We repeat the estimate from column (1) separately for men and women, in columns
(3) and (4), respectively. The treatment variable is negative for both genders though larger
Table 2.4: Distribution of Application Pairs Across Callback Types
Number Percent
No Callbacks 868 83.1
One Callback - No Cert 65 6.2
One Callback - Cert 46 4.4
Two Callbacks 65 6.2
Total 1,044 100.0
Notes: Table shows the distribution of application pairs across
four types: 1) neither control nor treatment application received
a callback; 2) only the control received a callback; 3) only the
treatment received a callback; and 4) both treatment and control
received a callback.
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Table 2.5: Linear Probability Regressions, Callback
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Certificate -0.024∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.021
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Cert X Female 0.021
(0.021)
Female 0.041∗∗ 0.030
(0.017) (0.021)
City
San Francisco 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.061)
Los Angeles 0.051∗ 0.051∗ 0.045 0.074
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.052)
Occupation
Admin. Assist. -0.035∗ -0.035∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032)
Acct. Assist. -0.049∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.039
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.034)
Observations 2,088 2,088 1,110 978
R2 0.039 0.039 0.054 0.047
Notes: Dependent variable is binary, and equals one if the applicant received a callback,
and zero otherwise. Omitted categories are Manager for occupation and New York for
city. Columns (1) and (2) include the full sample, while column (3) includes only men
and column (4) includes only women. All specifications include controls for month
job was posted, undergraduate degree type, undergraduate school, days between job
posting and when application was sent, and whether the application was the first of
the pair sent.
Standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the job level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
in magnitude for men, at -0.034 versus -0.021 for men versus women, respectively, and it
is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level for men though not significantly
different from zero at conventional levels for women.
To test whether the certificate impacts the callback rate differently across occupations,
the previous results are repeated separately by occupation. The results are shown in Table
2.6. For both managers and administrative assistants (columns 1 and 2, respectively), having
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Table 2.6: Linear Probability Regressions, Callback, by Job Type
(1) (2) (3)
Manager Admin. Assist. Acct. Assist.
Certificate -0.029 -0.043∗∗ 0.013
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Female 0.007 0.069∗∗ 0.046∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
City
San Francisco 0.095 0.176∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.070) (0.053) (0.058)
Los Angeles -0.033 0.070 0.129∗∗
(0.057) (0.047) (0.056)
Observations 768 748 572
R2 0.043 0.073 0.069
Notes: Dependent variable is binary, and equals one if the applicant received
a callback, and zero otherwise. Omitted category is New York. Results
shown separately by job opening type, with managers in column (1), ad-
ministrative assistants in column (2), and accounting assistants in column
(3). All specifications include controls for month job was posted, undergrad-
uate degree type, undergraduate school, days between job posting and when
application was sent, and whether the application was the first of the pair
sent.
Standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the job level. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a certificate is related to a substantial reduction in the probability of a callback relative to
the probability of receiving a callback by those who have no certificate: for managers, the
reduction is 2.9 percentage points (i.e. 18.6 percent relative to the overall manager response
rate), while for administrative assistants, the reduction is 4.3 percentage points (i.e. 32.8
percent relative to the overall manager administrative assistant response rate). The effect
is only statistically significant for administrative assistants, however. While the effect of
having a certificate is positive for accounting assistants, the coefficient is relatively small and
insignificant at conventional levels.
Finally, we test the impact of holding a certificate separately by city, with the results
shown in Table 2.7. Only in the San Francisco sample is there a statistically significant effect
of holding a certificate on callback rate, though the effect is quite large, at 7.6 percentage
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Table 2.7: Linear Probability Regressions, Callback, by City
(1) (2) (3)
New York San Francisco Los Angeles
Certificate -0.007 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.013) (0.027) (0.019)
Female 0.035 0.058 0.038
(0.024) (0.043) (0.026)
Occupation
Admin. Assist. -0.077∗∗∗ -0.068 -0.004
(0.030) (0.057) (0.032)
Acct. Assist. -0.058∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.033) (0.066) (0.034)
Observations 826 494 768
R2 0.037 0.064 0.044
Notes: Dependent variable is binary, and equals one if the applicant received
a callback, and zero otherwise. Omitted category is Manager. Results shown
separately by city, with New York in column (1), San Francisco in column (2),
and Los Angeles in column (3). All specifications include controls for month job
was posted, undergraduate degree type, undergraduate school, days between job
posting and when application was sent, and whether the application was the first
of the pair sent. Standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the job level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
points (i.e. 35.3 percent, relative to the overall rate in that city). This negative effect also
does not appear to be driven by a particular certificate-granting school: within application
pairs, for each certificate school in San Francisco, the application with the certificate received
a lower callback than the application without the certificate. Thus, it appears that there may
be some aspect of the labor market in that city that makes these certificates of significantly
negative value. Future work that fixes this error will give us a clearer answer to the cause of
this negative effect.
Overall, our results point to a somewhat surprising conclusion: job applicants who hold
a post-baccalaureate tend to have significantly lower callback rates than otherwise similar
applicants without certificates. The overall negative effect of post-baccalaureate certificates
is driven by the large negative effect observed in San Francisco and the negative effect
observed in administrative jobs. We do not observed significant effects of post-baccalaureate
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certificates in New York and Los Angeles as well as in managerial jobs. Only in accounting
jobs do we find what might be expected, which is that these post-baccalaureate certificates
improve callback rates. The caveat to this finding is that there was a typo in the re´sume´s
with certificates such that the expected date of completion was listed as May 2016 instead
of May 2017. Thus, it is unclear whether the effect is being driven by the perceived value of
the certificate or whether the typo is sending a negative signal about the applicant’s quality.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the causal effect of post-baccalaureate business certificates on the
probability of getting a callback for recent college graduates. A correspondence study is
used to find that a re´sume´ randomly assigned a post-baccalaureate business certificate is
significantly less likely to receive a callback in San Francisco. In the other cities in the study,
there are no significant differences between the two groups. Thus, the glowing testimonials
reported by schools are likely due to positive self-selection into getting the certificate. This
matches the anecdotal evidence provided by our contact in the business school who said
the students who enroll tend to be the most motivated students. Thus, the claims made
by schools that these programs yield strong positive results are not substantiated by this
experiment. However, a typo in the expected date of certificate completion is a competing
explanation as to why we find null or negative results depending on the city. Going forward,
this mistake has been corrected, and we will be able to examine the effect of certificates in
a re´sume´ without a typo.
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Chapter 3
The Short-Run Effects of
Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance on the Labor Market
Supply of Ill Workers
3.1 Introduction
When diagnosed with a chronic health condition, workers who have employer-sponsored
health insurance (ESI) benefits face a labor supply dilemma. On the one hand, newly
diagnosed workers may want to reduce labor supply or stop working altogether because they
may need to take time off from work for treatment and convalescence. They may also want
to reduce work hours as work stress can exacerbate their health problems. On the other
hand, workers with chronic health conditions also face increased risk of health care expenses
and subsequently, increased demand for health insurance. Since a majority of workers in the
U.S. obtain health insurance from full-time employment1, most workers with health problems
1In 2008, 61.1 percent of workers had coverage through their own employer (Rho and Schmitt (2010)).
Most of these workers have to be full-time workers to be eligible for health insurance benefits.
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must remain sufficiently employed to maintain health insurance coverage. This incentive to
work may constrain labor supply changes desired by workers with chronic health conditions.
While workers with no ESI may obtain health insurance in the individual markets, such
option is more expensive compared to prices paid if workers obtain it through their own
employment. Participants in the individual markets are worse off than workers with ESI for
a number of reasons. Because insuring firms pool the risks of their employees, employers pay
lower premiums from reduced adverse selection and lower administrative expenses. Moreover,
the health insurance costs of employers are also tax-deductible, further reducing the cost of
ESI relative to insurance from individual markets.
Prior to the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (other-
wise, known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA)), the price gap between individual markets
and pooled markets was greater for individuals with pre-existing conditions.2 For firms of-
fering health insurance to their workers, the worker and the employer pay a share of the
health insurance premiums of the worker. The premiums paid by workers whether they
have pre-existing conditions or not are the same because the Health Insurance Portability
Accountability Act (HIPAA) prohibits employers from charging more based on medical con-
ditions, claims experience, receipt of health care services, genetic information or disability.
Pre-ACA, individuals with pre-existing conditions who did not have health insurance through
their employer had difficulty finding insurance companies that offered affordable individual
insurance plans because no law prevented insurance companies from charging higher rates
for pre-existing conditions.
Regaining much-needed coverage through new employment is also challenging. First,
employees with health problems may have a lower likelihood of finding a job in firms offering
health insurance. Discrimination against less healthy individuals can arise from insurers’
2The Kaiser Family Foundation studied the efforts that seven hypothetically ill individuals would have
to make to find health insurance. The average annual premium offered was $3,996, a significant in-
crease from the standard average annual rate of $2,998 (Pollitz et al. (2001)). With the ACA, there
are some reports that individual rates may be even lower than group rates because individual health
plans must cover all individuals regardless of health and new subsidies are available for qualifying employ-
ees. (For example, see https://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/bid/322844/why-individual-health-insurance-is-
more-affordable-than-group-health-insurance.)
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practice of experience rating when setting a company’s health insurance premiums. This
matters more for small firms wherein one major illness may increase the group’s insurance
costs. Although the American Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits screening for health in hiring,
the law does not prohibit insurers from charging higher rates to account for expected higher
medical expenses for workers with a poor health history. To avoid high cost, firms may
refuse to hire workers with pre-existing conditions. Second, even if workers with pre-existing
conditions get employed by businesses offering health insurance, coverage is subject to length
of service requirements. Although this is only temporary, immediate coverage is essential for
workers who require medicines and/or medical services.
Legal provisions set in place to temporarily protect workers from losing their health insur-
ance coverage along with their employment do not guarantee protection. The Consolidated
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) mandates previous employers to provide cov-
erage for recently unemployed workers for 18 months. However, only a few take continued
coverage from previous employers because the employee must pay the full cost of the cover-
age, which is defined as 102 percent of the average cost of providing coverage. Doty, Rustgi,
Schoen and Collins (2009) found that although most unemployed workers are eligible, fewer
than one in ten extends coverage under this option for cost reasons.
The HIPAA also provides little additional protection. After exhausting coverage from
COBRA extension, the HIPAA enables workers to convert their group coverage into a re-
newable individual policy without exclusion for pre-existing conditions. However, this op-
tion may not be desirable as HIPAA does not cap the premium that the offering insurer may
charge. With the HIPAA, employees may also add to their insurance policy a spouse or other
dependent who loses job-related coverage, without waiting until the next open enrollment
cycle. This protection, however, is not beneficial to workers with medical conditions whose
spouses are not employed and those with employed spouses whose employer does not offer
health insurance coverage for family members.
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) also entitles eligible employees of covered em-
ployers to take 12 workweeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for specified family and medical
reasons with continuation of group health insurance coverage (United States Department
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of Labor,Wage and Hour Division, 2012). Although the Family Medical Leave Act(FMLA)
may help workers feel less constrained to stay at work and remain insured, not all workers
are covered and covered workers may not want to use FMLA for fear of adverse effects in
the workplace.3 In summary, these legislative measures may not keep ill workers from being
locked into their jobs to keep their health insurance.
To see whether employment-sponsored health insurance creates incentives for ill workers
to supply labor to maintain access to health insurance coverage, this paper compares the
labor supply changes made after a diagnosis by workers who depend on their employers for
health insurance to the changes in labor supply made by workers who are dependent on their
spouse’s employment for their insurance. I use the latter as the comparison group instead
of workers with no health insurance because these workers with coverage through their own
employer and workers with coverage through their spouse’s employer are more likely to be
homogeneous in terms of observable and unobservable attributes. I focus on the following
labor supply changes made 0, 6, 12 and 24 months after the diagnosis: changes in hours
worked, the probability of remaining employed and the probability of moving from full-time
to part-time.
The results of the paper confirm most of the findings of previous studies that ESI creates
incentives for workers with chronic health conditions to remain employed at a sufficient
level to maintain access to health insurance. Workers with their own employer-sponsored
insurance are 2.5 percentage points more likely to stay employed than workers who are
dependent on their spouse’s employer for their health insurance at the time of diagnosis.
This likelihood persists up to 24 months post-diagnosis and is significant 6 to 12 months
after diagnosis. For workers who have remained employed after their diagnosis, workers
who are dependent on their spouse’s employer for their health insurance reduce their labor
hours by more than workers with their own employer-sponsored insurance. This difference
in percentage reduction is 3.6 percent for the time of diagnosis, and it increases with time to
5.4 percent 24 months after diagnosis. There is also evidence that the likelihood of employees
3According to the U.S. Department of Labor, employees are eligible to take FMLA leave if they have
worked for their employer for at least 12 months, have worked for at least 1,250 hours over the previous 12
months, and work at a location where at least 50 employees are employed by the employer within 75 miles.
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who have insurance through their own employer are less likely to become part-time workers.
This paper addresses one of the limitations of the previous studies. First, the scope of
earlier studies was limited to either a single state, a single disease or a particular gender
or age group which limits the generalizability of conclusions to other settings. This paper
addresses such limitation by using the national NLSY data which reports information on
diagnosis of various illnesses. A large percentage of the diagnoses reported in NLSY were
hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, and mental health problems, which compared to previous
studies is more reflective of the national distribution of chronic health conditions faced by
residents in the US. These conditions were not included in any of the previous studies done on
this topic. The information from the NLSY dataset enables the examination of ESI effects by
illnesses although insufficient observations for other diseases poses a challenge. Since most of
the diseases in the NLSY are not life-threatening compared diseases investigated in previous
studies, this paper contributes analysis for the effects of ESI for workers with a diagnosis of
less severe conditions.
The rising prevalence of chronic illness in the workplace and the strong dependence of
these workers on their employers for health insurance highlights the importance of the in-
centives and possible pitfalls that ESI creates.4 This paper aims to help policy makers
understand some of these and the effectiveness of existing legislation in muting or exacerbat-
ing the effects of ESI on how workers make labor supply adjustments in response to health
problems.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I present a review of
related literature. This is followed by Section 3.3 which explains the empirical strategy.
Section 3.4 which describes the data while Section 3.5 reports the results and interpretation.
Section 3.6 concludes and provides suggestions for future studies.
4The incidence of chronic illness in the workplace is estimated by Hoffman and Schwartz (2008) to have
grown by 25% over the past 10 years to a total of nearly 58 million in 2006.
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3.2 Review of Related Literature
This investigation is related to following three strands of the literature: 1) research on the
labor supply of individuals who have ESI; 2) research on the effects of health on labor supply;
3) research on the effects of the interaction of health status and ESI.
The first strand of literature focuses on testing for “job lock” or the hypothesis that
workers are locked into their job to keep their health insurance. Gruber and Madrian (2002),
in their review of the literature on ESI, labor supply, and job mobility, conclude that there is
convincing evidence that health insurance plays a major role in job mobility decisions. Older
workers, for example, would not opt to retire unless there is an alternative coverage after
retiring from continued health insurance from employers or Medicaid.5 There is also evidence
that such job immobility is exhibited by married women. Buchmueller and Valletta (1999),
Olson (1998), Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000) and Schone and Vistnes (1997), among
others, find that the availability of spousal health insurance reduces labor participation and
has other effects on job choice decisions of married women.
This paper is also broadly related to research on the labor supply effects of health which,
for the most part, finds that poor health decrease labor supply.6 For example, results of
Bradley et al. (2007b) show that women with breast cancer, except those having in situ
cancer, were less likely to work 6 months following diagnosis relative to a control sample of
women. In the case of workers with psychiatric disorders, Ettner et al. (1997) find that such
disorders significantly reduced employment among men and women. This result has also
been observed in workers with diabetes (Vijan et al. (2004)).
Most closely related to this study is the third strand which directly analyzes the changes in
labor supply after a health shock. Previous studies show that the interaction of employment-
based health insurance (ESI) and health shocks constrain labor supply in the short-run.
Using Cox proportional hazard models, Stroupe et al. (2001) find that chronic illness reduces
job mobility of workers in Indiana who relied on their employer for coverage by about 40
5For examples, see Gruber and Madrian (1996), Gruber and Madrian (1995), Gustman and Steinmeier
(1994), Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001).
6Currie and Madrian (1999) provide a review on the effects of health on labor hours.
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percent as compared with otherwise similar workers who did not rely on their employer for
coverage. Bradley et al. (2012) and Bradley et al. (2007a) collect primary data from a sample
of married women who were newly diagnosed with breast cancer in Virginia and Detroit,
respectively. Both studies find that women with ESI were significantly more likely to remain
employed and less likely to cut weekly hours worked than were women with insurance from
spouse’s employer. Tunceli et al. (2009) examine the labor market supply changes of older
men and women from Pennsylvania diagnosed with all types of cancer from 1997 through
1999 compared to a non-cancer sample drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
They report higher employment rates after a cancer diagnosis for those with ESI compared
to those who had an alternative source of health insurance or who were uninsured. Bradley
et al. (2012) focus on older married men and study the effects of cancer, congestive heart
failure, stroke, lung disease, stroke and angina on labor supply. The study finds that for
some specifications of health shocks ESI encourages continued employment of men, although
not of women.
In this handful of studies that analyze the changes in labor supply after a health shock,
the scope of earlier studies is limited to either a single state, a single disease or a certain
gender or age group which limits the generalizability of conclusions to other settings. The
main contribution of the paper is that it uses the NLSY dataset which includes more medical
conditions and has national distribution. This paper focuses its analysis on the effects of ESI
for workers with benign and/or more common chronic diseases like hypertension, arthritis
and mental conditions.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I study the effects of having ESI before diagnosis on the labor supply outcomes
of newly diagnosed workers 0, 6, 12 and 24 months after diagnosis. I consider a sample of
workers who are fully employed at the baseline (pre-diagnosis) period. One is considered a
full-time worker if he or she works at least 32 hours per week.7 The labor market outcomes
7As in Bradley et al. (2007a).
55
considered are employment status (E), change in mean weekly hours worked (CH) and
change from full-time to part-time work (FT2PT ). Eit is equal to 1 if worker i is employed
t = 0, 6, 12, 24 months after diagnosis and 0 otherwise. CHit is the growth rate of Hit or the
average work hours of worker i at time t = 0, 6, 12, 24 months after diagnosis relative to Hib
or the average work hours of worker i at the baseline period b. CHit is calculated using the
following equation:
CHit =
Hit −Hib
Hib
∗ 100 (3.1)
FT2PTit is equal to 1 if worker i was fully employed at the baseline period b but is partially
employed t months after diagnosis and 0 otherwise.
The labor supply outcomes are modeled as functions of worker i’s source of health in-
surance in the baseline period (ESIib), a vector of control variables observed in the baseline
period (Xib) and unobserved influences (it). ESIib is equal to 1 if worker i has ESI at the
baseline period b or 0 if worker i depends on spouse’s employer for health insurance at the
baseline period. In particular, the following equation:
Yit = α + βESIit +Xibγ + it (3.2)
estimates the effects of ESI (and other exogenous variables) for labor supply outcome, Y ,
of workers who are fully employed (FTib = 1) and have insurance either from their own
or their spouse’s employer in the baseline period. I separately estimate Equation 3.2 for
different labor market outcomes, Y = Eit, CHit and FT2PTit at each period t (0, 6, 12, 18
months after the diagnosis). For Y =CHit and FT2PTit, I estimate Equation 3.2 conditional
on the worker being employed post-diagnosis. This condition is imposed to separate any
employment effects on these two labor supply indicators. Equation 3.2 is estimated as a
linear probability model.
I am interested in the coefficient on ESI, β. For estimated models with Y equal to
Eit and Y equal to CHit, a positive and significant β indicates significant effects of ESI in
locking workers with a diagnosis to employment and to a certain amount of work hours in
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order to secure health insurance. For estimated models with Y equals to Eit, a positive β
implies that workers with ESI tend to remain employed relative to workers with no ESI. For
estimated models with Y equals to CHit, a positive β implies that the reduction in mean
hours worked is smaller for workers with ESI than for workers with no ESI if both groups
of workers reduced their labor hours. For estimated models with Y equal to FT2PTit, a
negative and significant β indicates significant effects of ESI in preventing workers with a
diagnosis from becoming part-time workers in order to secure health insurance.
To control for observable differences between workers with ESI and workers insured
through their spouse, I include the following control variables in Xib: year of diagnosis,
gender, race, an indicator of whether there are any children in the household and its inter-
action with gender, marital status, age, age squared, education level measured by highest
grade completed and AFQT score which is a proxy for ability.8
Jobs that offer ESI may employ workers who are more dedicated and are more likely to
remain at work regardless of their cancer diagnosis. To account for variation in hours worked
in the pre-diagnosis period, I include the mean labor hours worked during the baseline period
in the vector of control variables and estimate the model using full-time workers alone.9
Workers with ESI may also tend to have lower income and/or are more likely to be the
breadwinner and hence, their labor supply may decrease less compared to a comparatively
ill worker who does not have ESI. To control for this, I also include pre-diagnosis household
income in 2002 dollars and pre-diagnosis share of worker i’s annual income to household
income.
To control for any differences in job characteristics, I also include job tenure, location
of residence (urban or rural), number of employees at the workplace and industry category.
It is possible that jobs that offer health insurance benefits require less physical strength.
If this is the case, workers with ESI may appear to reduce labor supply less than workers
with no ESI. This difference may be incorrectly attributed to the difference in the source of
health insurance. In view of this, I also include occupation category in the vector of control
8Most of these covariates were used in wage models used by Cowan and Schwab (2011b) which also used
the NLSY79 dataset.
9As in Bradley et al. (2007a).
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variables, Xib.
The severity of a chronic illness may limit the kind or amount of work that a person can
do and subsequently, the labor supply response. To see whether the labor supply response
differential associated with ESI varies by severity, I also estimate the following equation:
Yit = α + β ESIib + δ limitit + µ limitit ∗ ESIib +Xibγ + it (3.3)
using a sample that only includes respondents who have no work limitation before diagnosis
and include interactions of an indicator of post-diagnosis work limitation and ESI. The proxy
indicator for severity of illness is a dummy variable, limiti,after that is set equal to 1 if the
respondent experienced any current work limitation. The empirical model shows the main
and interactive effects of severity of the condition and health insurance source on labor supply
indicators t months following diagnosis. As usual, β measures the effect of having ESI for
workers with no limitation while δ measures the effect of having work limitation (that is
likely caused by the severity of illness). The coefficient, µ, measures the interactive effect of
having work limitation and ESI.
Using the following equation:
Yit = α + β ESI
only
ib + δ ESI
dependents
ib +Xibγyt + it (3.4)
I also test whether newly diagnosed workers whose employers also cover insurance of their
spouse and/or child are more locked into their jobs than workers who have ESI but no
dependents. ESIdependentsib is equal to 1 if worker i has other family members who have the
same ESI coverage and 0 otherwise and ESIonlyib is equals to 1 if worker i has no other family
members who have the same ESI coverage and 0 otherwise. The omitted variable is the
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the worker has coverage through spouse’s employer. If
δ is statistically significantly greater than β, then this means that workers with dependents
are more locked in their jobs than workers who have ESI but no dependents. I also use the
F-test to test the null hypothesis, δ 6=β. If the null hypothesis is rejected and δ is greater
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than β, then there is evidence of greater job/hour lock effects of ESI for ill workers with
dependents than ill workers with no dependents.
3.4 Data
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) which is a nationally
representative sample of 12,686 people aged 14-22 years in 1979. The NLSY was administered
annually until 1994, and biennially through 2014. Respondents were asked to answer the first
health module upon reaching 40 years old and another health module upon reaching 50 years
old. These modules ask whether the respondent was ever diagnosed with a chronic illness
and if yes, when (month and year) he or she was diagnosed. The chronic diseases covered
in the modules were hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, cancer, mental health problems, heart
attack, heart failure and stroke. By 2014, all the respondents had reached 50 years old and
had answered these health modules. As of 2014, about 4,892 respondents reported having
one of the diagnoses mentioned above. There were multiple diagnoses to other respondents,
but I restrict my sample to the first chronic illness diagnosis.
The NLSY asks whether respondents have health insurance policy and if yes, the source of
the policy. The source of the policy could be from the current employer, previous employer,
spouse’s current employer, spouse’s previous employer, individual markets, government or
others. Unfortunately, only take-up data is available, and there is no information on whether
the respondent or the spouse was offered any health insurance coverage from other sources.
I only use post-1988 data because the earlier years of the survey did not include questions
on health insurance status. Since I am only interested in the comparative effects of ESI and
insurance from spouse’s employer on the labor supply of workers with diagnosis, I limit my
main analysis to the sample of workers who get their coverage through their own employer
or their spouse’s employer.10 After these restrictions, I am left with 2,336 respondents with
10Survey respondents can indicate more than one of the following sources of coverage: current employer,
past employer, current spouse’s employer, previous spouse’s employer, private insurance, government pro-
grams and others. For those respondents who have ESI and insurance from spouse’s employer, I consider
them to have spouse’s employer.
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a diagnosis.
The NLSY provides weekly data from 1979 to 2014 on the respondent’s employment
status and hours worked. I collapse the weekly data on hours worked into monthly data.
From this data, I am able to derive the outcome variables, CHit, Eit and FT2PTit. CHit
is the growth rate of hours worked from baseline to t months after diagnosis. The baseline
period is 6 months before diagnosis. As mentioned earlier, I restrict the sample to individuals
who are fully employed 6 months before diagnosis with full employment defined as working
at least 32 hours per week. The respondent is considered employed for the month (i.e. Eit is
equal to 1) if he or she was employed at least a week of that month. If the respondent was
partially employed t months after diagnosis, then FT2PTit is set equal to 1 and 0 otherwise.
The NLSY also provides a rich source of control variables. As mentioned earlier, I control
for the year of diagnosis, gender, race, marital status, whether the worker has children, age,
education level, AFQT score, location of residence, household income, share of annual income
to household income, firm size, job tenure, industry, occupation categories and labor hours
supplied in the baseline period. Unfortunately, except for hours worked and the employment
status that is provided by the the NLSY on a weekly basis, the rest of the variables needed for
this study are given on a yearly basis from 1989 to 1994 and biennially, after that. As proxies
for the baseline values of the control variables, I use the values of the controls at the year of
diagnosis or one year before diagnosis. For workers who were diagnosed during the time the
NLSY was administered, I use information from that survey year.11 For workers who were
diagnosed when the NLSY was not administered, I use information from the previous year
(See Figure 3.1).
After exclusions for missing data for control variables and key study variables, the “Full”
sample includes 1,383 observations. I also construct a “Married Only” restricted to married
individuals alone. This alternative sample contains 892 observations.
11I can also use prior year data to get pre-determined baseline values. However, it is not very recent and
may not capture most recent insurance status.
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Figure 3.1: Source of Baseline Values of Control Variables
Notes: t=1989, ....., 2012 in this diagram. This figure does not pertain to household income and annual income variables.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 contains information on the distribution of diagnoses received by respondents
in the “Full” and “Married Only” samples. In the “Full” sample, there are 1,384 eligible
respondents who had a first diagnosis. 45.4 percent of the sample had been diagnosed
with hypertension, 21.9 percent had been diagnosed with arthritis, 16.7 percent had been
diagnosed with any mental health condition12 and 10.5 percent had diabetes diagnosis. A
small share (5.5%) had cancer, heart problems or stroke. Most of the health problems in the
sample are mild chronic illnesses but may lead to more severe conditions. Since most are
mild illnesses, this sample can be used to examine ESI effects on workers with more common
chronic illnesses like hypertension, mental illness, and arthritis which were not included in
past studies. The distribution of the “Married Only” sample mirrors that of the “Full”
sample.
Figure 3.2 also shows the distribution of the year of diagnosis. 97% of the respondents
in the sample were diagnosed on or before 2010, the year the ACA was signed by President
12Emotional, nervous or psychiatric problems.
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Barack Obama into law. Since the ACA was not fully implemented until 2014, it is then safe
to assume that the effects estimated are not convoluted by the significant change in health
policies during the Obama administration.
The summary statistics of labor supply indicators are presented in Table 3.2. Column 2
describes the “Full” sample while column 4 describes the “Married Only” sample. Columns
3 and 4 compare respondents with and without ESI for the “Full” sample while columns 6
and 7 do the same for the “Married Only” sample. To be able to make causal inferences
from the samples, the group with ESI and the group without ESI should only differ in terms
of health insurance and should be similar in terms of other pre-diagnosis unobservable and
observable characteristics.
Table 3.1: Sample Distribution of Diagnoses, by Source of Health Insurance
Full Sample Married Only Sample
Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI
N=1,383 N=1,117 N=266 N=892 N=633 N=259
% Share
Hypertension 45.4 47.8 35.3 45.2 49.1 35.5
Diabetes 10.5 10.4 10.9 11.0 10.9 11.2
Cancer 3.5 3.3 4.5 3.4 3.0 4.2
Mental 16.7 15.1 23.3 16.9 14.4 23.2
Arthritis 21.9 21.2 24.8 21.6 20.4 24.7
Heart Failure 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
Heart Attack 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.4 0.8
Stroke 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Any Ins refers to Any Insurance.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Diagnoses, by Year
Notes: The sample only includes the first diagnosis of a chronic illness of each eligible respondent.
For the “Full” sample, 81 percent have health insurance from their own employer (i.e.
ESI=1), and 19 percent have coverage through their spouse’s employer. For the married
sample, 71 percent have health insurance from their own employer, and the other 29 percent
are covered through their spouse’s employment-based insurance. This distribution is about
the same as the national distribution.
On average, respondents in the “Full” and “Married Only” samples work 46 hours per
week 6 months before diagnosis. This number is the same as the reported average number
of hours worked per week by full-time employees in a 2014 Gallup Survey (see Saad (2014)).
The mean work hours are almost the same for those with ESI and those with insurance from
their spouse’s employer. This indicates that workers in both groups have the same labor
market supply before diagnosis. This similarity of labor supply at the baseline bodes well
with the choice of using these two groups who differ in the source of insurance to detect any
differential effect of insurance source.
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Table 3.2: Mean Values of Labor Supply Indicators
Full Sample Married Only Sample
Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI
N=1,383 N=1,117 N=266 N=892 N=633 N=259
Has own ESI 0.81 1.00 0.00 0.71 1.00 0.00
Hrs wrked 6 mos bef 45.95 45.98 45.84 46.25 46.35 46.01
Employed=1
0 mos after diagnosis 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95
6 mos after diagnosis 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.88
12 mos after diagnosis 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.89
24 mos after diagnosis 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.89
% Change in hrs worked
0 mos after diagnosis -5.31 -4.10 -10.38 -5.32 -3.25 -10.37
6 mos after diagnosis -7.14 -5.66 -13.37 -6.74 -4.11 -13.16
12 mos after diagnosis -8.81 -7.59 -13.93 -7.29 -4.48 -14.17
24 mos after diagnosis -11.02 -9.81 -16.11 -10.03 -7.45 -16.35
% Change in hrs worked, Conditional
0 mos after diagnosis -1.83 -0.91 -5.78 -2.14 -0.58 -6.02
6 mos after diagnosis -0.29 -0.02 -1.52 -0.25 0.16 -1.35
12 mos after diagnosis -0.69 -0.07 -3.40 -0.49 0.61 -3.35
24 mos after diagnosis -1.94 -0.94 -6.24 -1.89 -0.20 -6.21
Changed from FT to PT
0 mos after diagnosis 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.16
6 mos after diagnosis 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.17
12 mos after diagnosis 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.19
24 mos after diagnosis 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.23
Changed from FT to PT, Conditional
0 mos after diagnosis 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.12
6 mos after diagnosis 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06
12 mos after diagnosis 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.09
24 mos after diagnosis 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.13
Notes: Any Ins refers to Any Insurance. Except for “Hrs wrked 6 mos bef”, “Change in hrs worked” and “Change in
hrs worked, Conditional”, the variables are all dummy variables. Conditional means conditional on being employed.
At the time of diagnosis (0 month after diagnosis), about 97 percent of workers with ESI
in the “Full” sample remained employed compared to 95 percent for workers with insurance
from spouse’s employer. Two years after diagnosis, this proportion decreases to 91 percent
for the former and 89 percent for the latter. The difference is slightly greater in the “Married
Only” sample where almost all (97%) of the workers with ESI remained employed compared
to 95 percent for workers with insurance from spouse’s employer at the time of diagnosis.
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Without accounting for employment effects (i.e., workers who are no longer employed
during and after diagnosis and hence, supply zero work hours), the mean hours worked for
workers in the “Full” sample increasingly declines post-diagnosis. The mean hours worked
of workers with ESI is lower by 4.1 percent during the time of diagnosis, lower than the 10.4
percent decline for workers with coverage from spouse’s employer. Mean hours worked drops
further 6, 12 and 24 months after diagnosis, reaching 9.8 percent 24 months post-diagnosis
for the workers with ESI and 16.1 percent for workers without ESI. The 9.8 percent decline
is equivalent to about 5 hours per week relative to the baseline mean labor hours and the
16.1 percent is equivalent to 8 hours relative to the respective baseline value. The difference
is more defined in the married only sample.
Conditional on being employed and hence, accounting for employment effects, the decline
of mean work hours between workers with ESI and workers with no ESI is now lower at any
period (0 to 24 months after diagnosis). At the time of diagnosis, the 0.9 percent decline
for workers with ESI is equivalent to only half an hour decline relative to the baseline mean
hours worked, and the 5.8 percent for the other group is equivalent to 2 hours relative to the
respective baseline value. The decline is more defined 24 months after diagnosis.
Conditional on being employed post-diagnosis, 11 percent of respondents who get cover-
age from spouse’s employer changed from being fully employed to partially employed, almost
4 times the proportion of respondents with ESI who became part-time workers (3%). The
gap in the fraction of people who became partially employed between these two groups does
not narrow down even two years post-diagnosis. This pattern in the change of labor hours
and the transition from being a full-time to a part-time worker, conditional and unconditional
to being employed post-diagnosis, is also observed in the “Married Only” sample.
Without controlling for other factors that may affect labor supply outcomes, the summary
statistics indicates that workers’ labor supply tends to be lower for workers with non-ESI
than workers with ESI. Figures 3.3 to 3.5 also show that workers with ESI compared to
workers with non-ESI tend to remain employed and for those who have remained employed,
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Figure 3.3: Share of Employed Workers in Sample
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Mean Weekly Hrs Worked, Conditional on Being Employed
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Share of PT Workers in Sample, Conditional on Being Employed
(a) (b)
Notes: Dark blue solid line refers to the ratio of part-time employees with ESI to the total number of workers with ESI at
baseline; area below and above the light blue lines is the 95% confidence interval. Dark red dashed line refers to the ratio of
part-time employees with spouse ESI to the total number of workers with spouse ESI at baseline; area below and above the
light red dashed lines is the 95% confidence interval.
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tend to have lower change in mean hours worked and to be less likely partially employed.
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. On average, workers in
the “Full” and “Married Only” samples received their first diagnosis at the age of 39, with no
significant difference in age at diagnosis between workers with ESI and workers with spouse
employment-based insurance. While almost half of the full sample are women, the proportion
of women in the group of workers with ESI is smaller than the proportion of women in the
group of workers with coverage from spouse’s employer. In terms of race, the fraction of
black workers in the group with ESI is greater than the proportion in the other group. In
the “Full” sample, the proportion of workers who have children is greater for the group with
coverage from spouse’s employer. However, in the “Married Only” sample, this proportion
is the same. In the full sample, 56 percent of workers with ESI are married, 24 percent were
formerly married, and about 20 percent were never married. The other group of workers
who depend on their spouse’s employer for coverage, by definition of the group, consist of
almost 100 percent married individuals (with about 2 percent formerly married). In terms
of educational attainment, the proportion of workers with higher education is slightly higher
for the group of workers with ESI compared to workers with non-ESI.
In the “Full” and “Married Only” samples, workers with ESI tend to have longer tenure
in their pre-diagnosis job compared to workers with no ESI. 53% respondents with ESI work
6+ years in their pre-diagnosis job, significantly higher than the proportion of respondents
without ESI with the same tenure. Also, workers with ESI tend to work in firms that are
relatively bigger in terms of the number of employees compared to workers with no ESI.
In the full sample, workers with ESI are more likely to have lower pre-diagnosis household
annual income relative to workers depending on spouse employer for coverage. However, for
the married sample, the distribution of household income between the two groups are very
similar. A more striking difference between the group of workers with ESI and the group of
workers with no ESI is the share of worker’s income to household income. Income of workers
with spouse insurance tends to have a lower share of household income compared to the
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share of workers with ESI.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Full Sample Married Only Sample
Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI Any Ins ESI Spouse ESI
N=1,383 N=1,117 N=266 N=892 N=633 N=259
Age 39.28 39.37 38.89 39.24 39.38 38.89
Female=1 0.50 0.46 0.66 0.45 0.37 0.65
Race: Black 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23
Race: Hispanic 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16
Race: White 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.61
Any children in HH=1 0.67 0.63 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.84
Never married=1 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Formerly married=1 0.20 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married==1 0.64 0.57 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
Education: <9 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Education: 9-12 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.49
Education: 13 and over 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.49
AFQT: 0-25 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.29
AFQT: 25-50 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.31
AFQT: 50-75 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.21
AFQT: 75-100 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.19
Job Tenure: 0-1 years 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.19
Job Tenure: 1-3 years 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.16 0.28
Job Tenure: 3-6 years 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.24
Job Tenure: 6+ years 0.49 0.53 0.29 0.48 0.56 0.29
Urban residence=1 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70
Employer size: 0-9 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.26
Employer size: 10-24 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.16
Employer size: 25-49 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.14
Employer size: 50-999 0.47 0.51 0.33 0.45 0.50 0.34
Employer size: 1000+ 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.10
HH Income: $0 - $30K 0.17 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05
HH Income: $30,001 - $50K 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.18
HH Income: $50,001 - $100K 0.44 0.41 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.56
HH Income: >$100K 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.21
Annual Inc <50 of HH Inc 0.28 0.20 0.64 0.41 0.31 0.65
Annual Inc >50 of HH Inc 0.72 0.80 0.36 0.59 0.69 0.35
Notes: Any Ins refers to Any Insurance. HH Income and Annual Income are in 2002 dollars.
3.5.2 Regression Results
Probability of Remaining Employed
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the various estimates of β, the coefficient on ESI in Equation
3.2 when the dependent variable is the probability of remaining employed 0, 6, 12 and 24
months after diagnosis. The specific β for workers diagnosed with diabetes, cancer, heart
attack, heart failure and stroke are not estimated because these sub-groups have insufficient
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observations.
Table 3.4: Estimated Coefficient of ESI, By Type of Diagnosis
Full Sample Married Only Sample
0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos 0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Employment
(1) All Diagnoses 0.0245 0.0553*** 0.0402* 0.0149 0.0185 0.0513** 0.0415* 0.0208
(0.0154) (0.0209) (0.0226) (0.0239) (0.0156) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0243)
1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 892 892 892 892
(2) Hypertension 0.0259 0.0669** 0.0548 0.0640* 0.0186 0.0641** 0.0680** 0.0793**
(0.0234) (0.0296) (0.0347) (0.0368) (0.0248) (0.0308) (0.0343) (0.0393)
628 628 628 628 403 403 403 403
(3) Mental 0.0244 0.0803 0.0244 0.0106 -0.0287 0.0939 0.0373 0.0269
(0.0489) (0.0581) (0.0599) (0.0644) (0.0553) (0.0650) (0.0659) (0.0722)
231 231 231 231 151 151 151 151
(4) Arthritis 0.0208 0.0293 0.00788 -0.0141 0.0464 0.0654 0.0289 0.0169
(0.0339) (0.0478) (0.0548) (0.0511) (0.0348) (0.0478) (0.0556) (0.0517)
303 303 303 303 193 193 193 193
Panel B. Dependent Variable: % Change in Hours Worked, Conditional
(1) All Diagnoses 3.573** 1.273 2.926 5.439*** 3.756** 1.350 3.069 4.669**
(1.603) (1.838) (1.926) (2.052) (1.730) (1.812) (1.999) (2.137)
1,334 1,288 1,270 1,255 863 834 831 818
(2) Hypertension 3.763 1.667 2.764 1.219 3.654 1.939 2.711 1.164
(2.473) (3.092) (3.063) (3.146) (2.706) (3.021) (3.294) (3.285)
609 597 583 577 391 384 379 372
(3) Mental 3.038 0.255 -1.487 0.386 6.289 0.952 -2.831 -1.118
(3.928) (4.032) (4.055) (5.193) (4.353) (3.980) (4.153) (5.622)
216 209 209 205 141 137 137 132
(4) Arthritis 7.150** 1.417 5.191 15.49*** 8.045* -0.479 3.029 17.53***
(3.219) (4.025) (4.718) (5.454) (4.110) (4.890) (5.463) (6.390)
294 282 277 279 188 181 179 179
Panel C. Dependent Variable: Change from Full-time to Part-time, Conditional
(1) All Diagnoses -0.0454** -0.0208 -0.0286* -0.0605*** -0.0423** -0.0261* -0.0313* -0.0597***
(0.0178) (0.0154) (0.0173) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0219)
1,334 1,288 1,270 1,255 863 834 831 818
(2) Hypertension -0.0469* -0.0241 -0.0433* -0.0489* -0.0373 -0.0305 -0.0523** -0.0393
(0.0260) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0274) (0.0285) (0.0229) (0.0251) (0.0281)
609 597 583 577 391 384 379 372
(3) Mental -0.0793 -0.0497 -0.0172 0.00840 -0.101* -0.0879** 0.00931 0.0229
(0.0516) (0.0430) (0.0493) (0.0673) (0.0569) (0.0409) (0.0543) (0.0801)
216 209 209 205 141 137 137 132
(4) Arthritis -0.0769** -0.0236 -0.0408 -0.0872* -0.101** -0.0330 -0.0367 -0.108*
(0.0371) (0.0329) (0.0375) (0.0466) (0.0458) (0.0456) (0.0465) (0.0564)
294 282 277 279 188 181 179 179
Notes: For each item in each panel, the number in first row is the estimated coefficient. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The second row contains the standard errors (in parentheses) while the third row contains the number of observations. Control
variables are included in the estimation.
For the “Full” sample, β is positive across almost all sub-groups, consistent with the hy-
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pothesis that newly diagnosed workers with ESI are more likely to remain employed to keep
ESI relative to workers who are less dependent on their own employer for health insurance.
Looking at “Full” sample with all types of diagnoses (Panel A (1)), the estimates imply that
workers with ESI are 2.5 percentage points more likely to be employed than workers with
health insurance through their spouse’s employer at the time of diagnosis, 5.5 percentage
points more likely 6 months after diagnosis before declining to only 1.5 percentage points
more likely 24 months after diagnosis. However, the coefficients are only significant 6 and
12 months after diagnosis.
The estimates are lower than the estimates of Bradley et al. (2007a) and close to the
estimates of Bradley et al. (2013) for women with breast cancer. In Bradley et al. (2007a),
women with ESI were 10 percentage points more likely to be employed at six months fol-
lowing diagnosis, but this estimate was not statistically significant. At 12 months following
diagnosis, women with ESI were 13 percentage points more likely to be employed than women
without ESI. The difference in employment lock effects compared to Bradley et al. (2007a)
is probably caused by the composition of health conditions in the samples used. Most of the
health conditions in the sample used in this paper are relatively milder conditions relative
to the cancer sample used in Bradley et al. (2007a) and Bradley et al. (2013). Since cancer
requires a more intense treatment regimen, workers in the cancer sample are more likely
to stop working altogether upon and after diagnosis. Nevertheless, I see significant effects,
albeit at a smaller magnitude, for workers diagnosed with milder illnesses.
The effects of having ESI on remaining employed are mostly positive across all types
of diagnoses except for married workers with mental conditions (at the time of diagnosis)
and for workers with arthritis (24 months after diagnosis). For hypertension, there seems
to be a significant effect a few months after diagnosis. While the sign of the coefficients
support employment effects of ESI for workers with mental and arthritis, the effects are not
significant at the conventional levels.
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Change in weekly hours worked
Panel B of Table 3.4 provides various estimates of β which represent the effects of ESI on
percent changes in weekly hours worked for workers with health problems 0, 6, 12, and
24 months following diagnosis, conditional on remaining employed during the period. The
descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 show that the mean labor hours worked declines during
and after diagnosis for workers with ESI and workers without ESI (except at 6 and 12
months after diagnosis in the “Married Only” sample). Hence, a positive β means that the
reduction is smaller for workers with ESI relative to workers with no ESI. The coefficients
from the conditional model are positive in most samples and sub-samples which means that
while workers on average tend to reduce their weekly labor hours, the reduction tends to be
lower for workers with ESI than workers with no ESI. This implies that, relative to workers
with insurance from spouse’s employer, newly diagnosed workers with ESI are more locked
into a certain amount of work hours to keep insurance. For the “Full” and “Married Only”
samples, the percentage reduction in mean labor hours worked per week is significantly lower
by more than 3.5 percentage points for workers with ESI relative to workers dependent on
their spouse’s employer at the time of diagnosis (see Panel B (1)). This coefficient drops 6
months post-diagnosis and starts to increase 12 and 24 months after.
Conditional on remaining employed, the effects of ESI for workers with arthritis diagnosis
on changes in labor hours worked are relatively larger (see Panel B (2)). The effects on
workers with hypertension are positive but insignificant (see Panel B (3) and (4)). The
immediate effects of ESI for workers with mental conditions are positive but it turns negative
12 and 24 months after (for married workers). This means that workers with mental problems
and ESI who have remained employed will more likely reduce their hours by more 12 months
after diagnosis.
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Change from Full Time to Part-time Work
Panel C of Table 3.4 shows the ESI effects of getting diagnosed on the probability of becoming
partially employed (i.e. working less than 32 hours per week) conditional on being employed
post-diagnosis. A negative coefficient of ESI means that workers with ESI tend to remain
fully employed compared to workers with coverage from spouse’s employer. The results show
that the coefficients estimated for “Full” and “Married Only” samples for workers with all
types of diagnosis are negative. The coefficients are significant at conventional levels across
all periods (except for “Full” sample 6 months after diagnosis). Since full employment is
usually required to be eligible for ESI, this supports the hypothesis that workers with ESI
tend to remain fully employed to keep health insurance.
In summary, results from Table 3.4 provides stronger evidence for intensive effects of ESI
compared to extensive effects (employment effects) of ESI.
Controlling for Limitation
Table 3.5 presents the estimates for Equation 3.3 using all workers with all types of diagnoses.
It shows the effects of having ESI for those with and without limitations on the three labor
supply indicators.
For the “Full” sample, workers with ESI and no limitation are 2.1, 5.2, 3.7 and 1.7
percentage points more likely (relative to workers with non-ESI) to remain employed 0, 6,
12 and 24 months after diagnosis, respectively (See Tables 3.5 Panel A (1)). As expected,
workers with limitation are less likely to remain employed (Table 3.5 Panel A (2)). The
sign of the interactive effects of ESI and limitation is mostly negative and relatively large
compared to the the coefficient on ESI. This means that workers with ESI and limitation are
less likely to remain employed (Table 3.5 Panel A (3)). The pattern, however, is different for
married workers wherein the interactive effects of ESI and limitation is mostly positive and
relatively large to the coefficient of ESI. This means that married workers with limitation
and ESI are more likely to be employed at least for the first 12 months after diagnosis.
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For those workers who remained employed after the diagnosis, workers with ESI and no
limitation still tend to exhibit a smaller reduction in labor hours worked (Table 3.5 Panel
B (1)). Limitation significantly and negatively affects labor hours (Table 3.5 Panel B (2)).
The coefficient of the interaction of ESI and limitation is mostly positive and large relative
to the coefficient of ESI. This implies that workers with ESI and limitation even tend to have
a smaller reduction in labor hours relative to workers with ESI and no limitation. (Table
3.5 Panel B(3)).
Table 3.5: Estimated Coefficient of ESI With Work Limitation Control
Full Sample Married Only Sample
0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos 0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Employment
(1) ESI 0.0216 0.0518** 0.0369 0.0174 0.0164 0.0417* 0.0303 0.0168
(0.0158) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0244) (0.0160) (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0247)
(2) Limitation -0.149** -0.00472 -0.0225 -0.00369 -0.156*** -0.0120 -0.0268 -0.0115
(0.0591) (0.0863) (0.0909) (0.0569) (0.0756) (0.0801) (0.0875) (0.0833)
(3) ESI*Limitation 0.0899 -0.0982 -0.0890 -0.120 0.0349 0.0674 0.0307 -0.0409
(0.0677) (0.0892) (0.0987) (0.104) (0.0739) (0.0982) (0.104) (0.114)
N 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 834 834 834 834
Panel B. Dependent Variable: % Change in Hours Worked, Conditional
(1) ESI 3.658** 1.265 3.734* 5.598*** 3.882** 1.028 3.873* 4.581**
(1.666) (1.919) (2.025) (2.142) (1.804) (1.894) (2.118) (2.206)
(2) Limitation -23.83*** -16.44** -7.428 -1.878 -23.98*** -17.22** -9.209 -4.152
(6.822) (7.271) (7.680) (8.069) (7.071) (6.885) (7.666) (7.938)
(3) ESI*Limitation 17.80** 18.02** 2.998 -1.175 21.02** 22.17** 2.925 0.149
(7.688) (8.401) (8.925) (9.434) (9.077) (8.758) (9.905) (10.45)
N 1,256 1,220 1,199 1,188 808 786 780 770
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Change from Full-time to Part-time Employment, Conditional
(1) ESI -0.0458*** -0.0144 -0.0319* -0.0583*** -0.0441** -0.0162 -0.0354* -0.0592***
(0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0210) (0.0191) (0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0223)
(2) Limitation 0.400*** 0.288*** 0.151** 0.00173 0.415*** 0.295*** 0.161** 0.000739
(0.0710) (0.0594) (0.0672) (0.0791) (0.0750) (0.0558) (0.0680) (0.0803)
(3) ESI*Limitation -0.334*** -0.279*** -0.116 0.0341 -0.376*** -0.340*** -0.0580 0.114
(0.0800) (0.0687) (0.0781) (0.0925) (0.0962) (0.0710) (0.0878) (0.106)
N 1,256 1,220 1,199 1,188 808 786 780 770
Notes: For each item in each panel, the number in first row is the estimated coefficient of ESI. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The second row contains the standard errors (in parentheses). Control variables are
included in the estimation.
The effects of ESI for workers with no limitation on the likelihood of becoming partially-
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employed are all negative, implying that workers with ESI tend to become partially employed
during and after diagnosis (Table 3.5 Panel C (1)). This is significant 0, 12 and 24 months
after diagnosis. Again, the effects of having limitation are opposite the effects of ESI and
strongly significant 0, 6 and 12 months post-diagnosis in both samples. For workers who
have remained employed and have a limitation, having ESI seems to constrain them from
becoming partially employed since the interactive effects of ESI and limitation are negative
and significant (except for the 24th month after diagnosis).
Controlling for Intensity of Dependence on ESI
Table 3.6 shows the estimates for Equation 3.4 which tests whether newly diagnosed workers
whose employers also cover insurance of their spouse and/or child are more locked into
their jobs than workers who have ESI but no dependents. The estimated coefficients on
ESI for those with or without dependents are all positive when the dependent variables are
the probability of remaining employed and change in mean work hours while the estimated
coefficients are mostly negative when the dependent variable is the probability of becoming
a part-time worker.
The signs of the coefficients in Table 3.6 support the findings discussed earlier that
having ESI incentivizes workers – with or without dependents– to remain employed to keep
health insurance. Using an F-test, I test the null hypothesis that there is no statistical
difference between the estimated coefficient for workers with no dependents and the estimated
coefficient for workers with dependents. The p-values for almost all of the F-tests in Table
3.6 is greater than 10%. Thus, I do not not reject the null hypothesis. This means that there
is no difference in “job/hour lock” effects of ESI between ill workers with dependents and ill
workers with no dependents.
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Table 3.6: Estimated Coefficient of Indicators of ESI Dependency Level
All Married
0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos 0 Mo 6 Mos 12 Mos 24 Mos
A. Dependent Variable: Employment
(1) Only Worker Depends ESI 0.0185 0.0299 0.0464* 0.0161 0.0201 0.0261 0.0405 0.0218
(0.0186) (0.0253) (0.0272) (0.0289) (0.0202) (0.0278) (0.0286) (0.0314)
(2) Spouse/Child also depend on ESI 0.0222 0.0448** 0.0408* 0.0275 0.0199 0.0456** 0.0407* 0.0310
(0.0162) (0.0220) (0.0237) (0.0251) (0.0165) (0.0227) (0.0233) (0.0257)
N 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 892 892 892 892
Ho: (1) = (2)
F-test p-value 0.32 0.24 0.09 0.58 0.32 0.35 0.16 0.49
B. Dependent Variable: % Change in Hours Worked, Conditional
(1) Only Worker Depends ESI 2.731 1.701 1.587 4.084 0.869 1.277 0.934 0.765
(1.924) (2.218) (2.326) (2.489) (2.231) (2.360) (2.580) (2.773)
(2) Spouse/Child also depend on ESI 2.283 0.776 3.135 4.196* 2.966 0.867 3.299 3.704
(1.682) (1.920) (2.023) (2.161) (1.832) (1.907) (2.108) (2.258)
N 1,334 1,288 1,270 1,255 863 834 831 818
Ho: (1) = (2)
F-test p-value 0.16 0.44 0.50 0.10 0.70 0.59 0.72 0.78
C. Dependent Variable: Change from Full-time to Part-time, Conditional
(1) Only Worker Depends ESI -0.0472** -0.0207 -0.0254 -0.0182 -0.0331 -0.0260 -0.0316 0.00324
(1.924) (2.218) (2.326) (2.489) (2.231) (2.360) (2.580) (2.773)
(2) Spouse/Child also depend on ESI -0.0360* -0.0153 -0.0283 -0.0478** -0.0349* -0.0192 -0.0272 -0.0495**
(1.682) (1.920) (2.023) (2.161) (1.832) (1.907) (2.108) (2.258)
N 1,334 1,288 1,270 1,255 863 834 831 818
Ho: (1) = (2)
F-test p-value 0.03 0.27 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.91
Notes: For each item in each panel, the number in first row is the estimated coefficient of ESI. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. The second row contains the standard errors (in parentheses). Other control variables are included in the estimation.
3.6 Conclusion
Despite the existence of legislative measures that were intended to protect workers from the
dangers of losing ESI, this paper finds evidence that the current system wherein most of
the workers (and their family members) are dependent on their employers for their health
coverage creates incentives for ill workers to remain fully employed and to reduce their hours
by less relative to workers who get their health insurace through their spouse’s employer.
The evidence is weaker for employment effects of ESI compared to the evidence for intensive
effects of ESI. This paper covers mostly mild illnesses (unlike in past research that focuses
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on severe illnesses) and thus, results may imply that severe cases tend to have even more
severe consequences.
The main advantage of this study over previous work is that it is not confined to a
single state and single illness which does not limit generalizability. However, there are also
limitations to this study. Since the source of health insurance is not randomly assigned,
dissimilarities between workers with ESI and coverage from spouse’s employer may still occur,
and I cannot completely rule out the possibility of having biased estimates. Possible sources
of bias comes from endogeneity of ESI. Workers who have more labor market attachment
tend to anticipate chronic illness and may self-select into having ESI prior to diagnosis. I
assumed that the baseline values of ESI, marital status and other control variables do not
change 0, 6, 12 and 24 months after diagnosis. This many not be necessarily true shown in
Table 3.7 which tabulates insurance source and marital status of workers in the sample in
the survey years before and during/after diagnosis. Differences in jobs with ESI and jobs
with non-ESI that are not insurance-related may also confound results. Jobs with ESI may
be more desirable and have better job quality that workers with ESI tend to be able to work
more after diagnosis.
Table 3.7: Percent Share Before and After Diagnosis, by Insurance Status and Marital Status
Yr of Diagnosis Before Diagnosis
ESI Spouse ESI Missing Info
ESI 12.0 5.3 2.0
Spouse ESI 9.8 61.0 10.0
Never Married Married Others
Never Married 15.7 0.0 0.1
Married 0.9 60.3 3.3
Others 0.1 2.7 16.9
As the debate on the US health insurance system continues to be on center stage, research
on the effects of ESI is timely and can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of
the current system. “Job lock” and/or “hours lock” may be disadvantageous if it prevents
employees from doing the necessary adjustments in response to their health conditions. In
the long run, workers who became locked up may be less productive relative to workers
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who were not locked up. This potential loss in productivity may be more costly from the
perspective of the employer and for society, as a whole.
Areas for future study include verifying the long-run existence of job lock as well as long-
run effects of job lock on the health of workers. Since the ACA prohibits premium rating
based on pre-existing conditions in the individual markets, it is also worth investigating
how the ACA changes the effect of ESI on sick workers’ willingness to remain employed
sufficiently.
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September 22, 2016 
 
Company W 
Brooklyn, NY 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
I am writing in regards to the open  Sales Associate position that your 
company recently advertised online. 
 
I am an experienced job applicant who is adept in dealing with customers and 
selling products. I am a strong team player who is able to work in any diverse 
& fast-paced commercially driven environment.  
 
I resigned from my last job because our family had to move here from Seattle. 
 
I would love to have an opportunity to be associated with your company. 
Please find attached my current resume for your careful consideration. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Ryan Miller 
2348 Midland Ave 
Staten Island, NY 10306 
Email: millerryan238@gmail.com 
Telephone: 646.766.9116 
Treatment Group 1: Newly Unemployed
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Ryan Miller 
 
Address line 1 Telephone: 646.766.9116 
Staten Island, NY 10306  Email: millerryan238@gmail.com 
 
OBJECTIVE 
Seeking a position where my sales skills and experience can be use to contribute to a 
company that provides opportunities for professional advancement 
 
SKILLS 
I have great customer service skills, computer skills (including cash register operation), 
and soft skills such as teamwork and communication skills. I am also a quick learner. 
 
EDUCATION 
High School 3, Seattle, WA, 2010 
 
EXPERIENCE: 
Company R, Seattle, WA    
September 2012 - September 2016 
Retail Sales Associate 
 Assessed customer needs and concerns and offered product solutions 
 Provided  accurate processing for all customer transaction 
 Maintained selling floor presentations, and restocked them as needed 
 Handled all returns courteously and professionally 
 
Company P, Seattle, WA    
September 2010 - September 2012 
Service Clerk 
 Greeted and assisted guests in finding appropriate departments, aisles, services and 
products 
 Organized merchandise products and count store inventory 
 Installed and maintained store displays and signage to match company standards 
and accurately reflect weekly sales 
 
COMMUNITY WORK 
I have volunteered for the Watch the Wild program. 
Treatment Group 1: Newly Unemployed
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September 21, 2016 
 
 
To whom it may concern: 
 
I am writing in response to your advertisement for the position of Sales Associate, and 
would like to submit my resume for the position. I believe I will be able to contribute to 
the success of your company. I have 6 years of work experience.  I was most recently 
associated with Company X in Brooklyn, NY, where I gained important lessons and skills 
in achieving sales target and providing high-quality customer service.   
 
I stopped working because I had a medical issue. It is now taken care of and I am ready to 
get back to work. 
 
I have attached my resume so that you can see my professional skills and qualifications in 
greater detail. I hope you will grant me an opportunity to meet you in person to discuss my 
application further. I am looking forward to hearing from you. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Joshua Smith 
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Joshua Smith 
Address Line 1 
Queens, NY 11428 
Email: smith.joshua.work@gmail.com 
Cell: 347-851-8963 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________  
 
OBJECTIVE 
To work as a sales asociate in an environment that allow for professional growth  opportunities 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
Sales Specialist  
Company X Brooklyn, NY December 2012 -  December 
2015 
 Engaged with customers to quickly identify and meet their needs 
 Marketed new sales and promotions 
 Assisted with store inventory, merchandising, and display organization 
 Opened and closed cash registers, tallied daily totals, and processed money deposits 
 
Customer Service/Sales Associate 
Company Y Brooklyn, NY December 2009 - December 
2012 
 Used POS cash registers to complete transactions and process returns 
 Helped customers find merchandise within the store 
 Helped customers with the in-store kiosk and in placing orders from the Staples website 
 Ensured that the assigned section were neat and tidy for the following day 
 
CORE COMPETENCIES 
Excellent customer services skills;  Proficient in Data Entry; Proficient in Microsoft Word, Excel and 
PowerPoint; POS system 
 
 
EDUCATION 
High School 1, New York, NY, 2009 
 
INTEREST 
 
Organizer/Member, Cancer survivors' group 
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September 20, 2016 
 
Human Resource Staff 
Company W 
Brooklyn, NY 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
I would like to apply for the position of Sales Associate at Company W.  
 
As a Sales Associate with Company S, I gained extensive experience in 
sales/customer service. I also enjoy helping and interacting with customers which 
has helped me succeed in my job.  My personality and qualifications make me a 
suitable candidate for the position.   
 
Please contact me at your earliest convenience to discuss how I may fit in at your 
company. I look forward to hearing from you and thank you for your time. 
 
Warmly, 
 
Andrew Johnson 
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Name Andrew Johnson 
Address 
Address line 1 
Brooklyn, NY 11224 
Telephone number (585) 209-5129 
E-mail andrewethanjohnson@gmail.com 
 
Objective 
 
To obtain a sales associate position within an established 
company that can offer an opportunity for career 
advancment 
Education  High School 2, New York, NY, 2009 
Experiences 
 
Sales Associate 
Company S, Brooklyn, NY, January 2013 -  January 2015 
Responsibilities: Understood shoppers' needs and provided 
options and advice on meeting those needs; Maintained 
knowledge of current sales, promotions, policies regarding 
payment and exchanges as well as security practices; 
Conducted sales transaction using the POS system; 
Cleaned and organized the store, including the checkout 
desk and displays 
 
Server 
Company T, Brooklyn, NY, January 2009 -  January 2013 
Responsibilities: Ensured that every guest felt important and 
welcome; Presented the menu, answered questions, and 
made suggestions regarding food and beverage and took 
orders; Followed all cash handling policies and procedures; 
Pre-bused tables, maintained table cleanliness, and bused 
tables  
Professional Skills 
 
 
Strong customer service skills. Cash handling. Proficient in 
Internet Explorer  and Microsoft Office Word/Excel. Team 
player. Strong interpersonal skills. Easily manage multiple 
priorities/tasks 
Other Activities 
 
Drawing, Running and Photography 
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Michael Baker 
Address 1 
Address 2 
Email: michaelbaker@gmail.com 
Cell: 111-222-3333 
______________________________________________________________________________________  
 
OBJECTIVE 
 
To contribute managerial skills and experience to your firm in a management capacity 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
Store Manager  
X Company Los Angeles, CA February 2015 -  present 
 Responsible for development of team to accomplish store's business objectives through recruitment, 
selection, coaching, investment, engagement, retention, and motivation. 
 Directed merchandise presentation, restocking, and recovery to maximize productivity. 
 Performed opening and closing procedures including maintaining registers, preparing bank deposits, 
preparing store for next day's business and accepting and receiving merchandise shipments. 
 
SKILLS 
 
Computer proficient in Microsoft Office: Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access; Adobe InDesign 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
BS Chemistry,  University of  ________ ,  2015 
 
LEADERSHIP  
 
 Student Diplomat, Office of Admission 
- Served as student representative for prospective students and their families. 
 Elected to positions to generate interest in multicultural organizations. 
 Mentored at-risk junior-high students to help them improve their grades. 
 Helped organize and coordinated events during the International Week 
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Robert Nelson 
 
Address 1                     Telephone: 444-555-6666 
City, State Zipcode 
 
Email: robertnelson@gmail.com  
OBJECTIVE 
Seeking a managerial position 
 
SKILLS 
Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, Excel, SPSS 
 
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 
Online Business Administration Certificate, University of _________, Expected May 2016 
 
EDUCATION 
BA Psychology, _________ University, 2014 
 
EXPERIENCE: 
 
Sales Consultant/Sales manager 
Y Company 
Los Angeles, CA 
Aug 2014 - present  
 
 Analyzed applicant's financial status, credit, and property evaluation to determine 
feasibility of granting loans. 
 Adhered to all federal and state compliance guidelines relative to mortgage lending. 
 Executed the loan origination process including appraisals, credit reports, ordering title, 
and closing procedures. 
 
INTERNSHIP 
 
 Special Events Intern, Company Z 
- Coordinated receptions and business meetings. 
- Helped design and distribute monthly employee newsletters. 
 
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES  
 
 Developed and implemented class programs and spearheaded efforts to raise funds for 
nonprofit organizations. 
 Generated funds for events and promoted alcohol-abuse awareness campus-wide. 
 Volunteered with the local Boys and Girls Club. 
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